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sequences of the Alrosa Court judgment, and offers some suggestions on how to establish a better
equilibrium between the legitimate objective of promoting the effectiveness of the Commission by
allowing it enough flexibility to end cases when competition could be restored rapidly and without
major expense thanks to the cooperation of investigated firms, while respecting the necessity to
ensure that the effectiveness of enforcement remains compatible with three goals: developing a
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INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (the “Regulation”), 
which came into force in 2004, modernized European competition 
law. One of its provisions (Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003), which 
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attracted little notice at the time, modified and improved the 
conditions under which the European Commission (“EC” or the 
“Commission”) could end a case by accepting commitments on the 
part of the investigated firm.1 The Commission had, in the past, 
already accepted commitments from investigated firms, but without 
being able to make those commitments binding. Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 was a welcome procedural improvement designed 
to fill this gap by providing the Commission with a procedural tool to 
make binding commitments that undertakings were willing to offer, if 
these commitments met the competition concerns of the Commission 
in cases where the fining of the firms was involved. It was thought 
that the use of this instrument would allow the Commission to free 
resources for other types of cases deserving an enforcement decision 
—Article 7 of the Regulation 1/2003. Contrary to what had been 
expected, the development of commitment decisions to the detriment 
of enforcement decisions has become the hallmark of the EU antitrust 
enforcement regime for all cases except cartel cases because cartels 
are a hard core violation of EU competition law deserving stiff fines. 
In the ten years since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, enforcement 
decisions have become the exception—even though the level of fines 
in enforcement decisions has rapidly increased—and commitment 
decisions have become the norm. One of the major reasons for this 
development is the Alrosa European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the 
“Court”) judgment, where the Court adopted an overly formalistic 
approach, which allows the Commission to enjoy a level of discretion 
in commitment decisions that it does not have in enforcement 
decisions, particularly with respect to structural remedies. As a result, 
the Commission has completely changed its approach to the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the EU Treaty. It has moved 
from an ex post rigorous economic analysis of firms’ behaviors and of 
their impact on competition, to an ex ante regulatory approach where 
investigated firms are expected to offer commitments, whether 
structural or behavioral, which meet the Commission’s competition 
concerns in a procedure where the rights of investigated firms are 
much reduced. The Commission has used this procedure to move 
from the objective of restoring competition to a wider objective of 
creating competition conditions by restructuring markets. The 
uncontrolled use of commitment decisions allowed by the ECJ has 
                                                            
1. This Article does not deal with the cartel settlement procedure introduced by the 
Commission on June 30, 2008. 
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weakened legal certainty in the area of competition law and enabled 
the Commission to bypass the constraints of a “more economic 
approach” in the name of enforcement effectiveness. This Article 
details the evolution of the commitment decisions, analyzes the logic 
and the consequences of the Alrosa Court judgment, and offers some 
suggestions on how to establish a better equilibrium between the 
legitimate objective of promoting the effectiveness of the 
Commission by allowing it enough flexibility to end cases when 
competition could be restored rapidly and without major expense 
thanks to the cooperation of investigated firms, while respecting the 
necessity to ensure that the effectiveness of enforcement remains 
compatible with three goals: developing a robust competition law 
jurisprudence to ensure legal predictability, particularly in abuse of 
dominance cases; ensuring that chosen remedies are not only the most 
effective to solve a case but also the most efficient way to restore 
competition on the affected markets; and offering investigated firms 
willing to cooperate with the Commission an adequate level of 
procedural rights. 
I. COMMITMENT PROCEDURES BEFORE REGULATION 1/2003 
Prior to the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission had 
occasionally settled cases. It had accepted behavioral commitments 
from parties by using a variety of procedures that led it to issue a 
negative clearance decision, or to give an exemption or a comfort 
letter or not to open a case or to terminate proceedings or to decrease 
the level of sanctions or not to adopt interim measures.2 As early as 
1975, in its annual report the Commission wrote,  
In 1975, as in previous years, a large number of cases were 
settled without a formal decision being made. Although this 
procedure is less well known and has less legal value than a 
formal decision, its importance should not be 
underestimated, as it enables some cases to be settled with a 
minimum of administrative intervention.3 
                                                            
2. For an example of the latter possibility, see the commitments in Hilti AG v. Comm’n, 
Case T-30/89, [1991] E.C.R II-1445, ¶ 7. 
3. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION 
POLICY 1975, at 9 (1976), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/
annual_report/. 
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To take a few examples, in December 1984 the Commission 
decided in the Wood Pulp case4 that it would sanction the firms which 
had exchanged information on prices. To arrive at this decision, the 
Commission took into account the fact that: “most of the respondents 
have given an undertaking as to their future behavior which is likely 
to reduce the artificial transparency of the market and thus to improve 
the competitive conditions of the relevant market and to lessen the 
risk of future infringements.” As a result of this undertaking, the firms 
were granted a significant reduction in the fines imposed. 
In 1985 in the Hilti case, Bauco (a nail manufacturer) had 
alleged that Hilti had breached Article 86 and requested interim 
measures. In particular, Bauco made a variety of allegations: 1) that 
its customers could not buy Hilti cartridge strips without nails, thus 
making it difficult for Bauco to sell its own nails; 2) that Hilti had 
refused to supply cartridge strips to Bauco; 3) that Bauco's attempts to 
buy, via third parties, cartridge strips from Hilti's independent 
distributor in the Netherlands were blocked; and 4) that Hilti reduced 
discounts to Bauco's customers on Hilti goods because they bought 
Bauco nails. The Commission initiated the procedure pursuant to 
Article 3(1) of Regulation No 17 and sent a statement of objections to 
Hilti, the object of which was to lead to interim measures being taken. 
But rather than exercise its right of defense in the case for interim 
measures, Hilti offered without prejudice, and the Commission 
accepted, an undertaking on August 27, 1985 which was to last until 
the Commission had completed its investigations and made a final 
determination on the case. For the duration of this undertaking, Hilti 
declared that it would no longer tie the sale of cartridge strips to that 
of nails and would not discriminate by discounts against orders for 
cartridge magazines alone or take any measures with similar effect.5  
In March 1997 the Commission initiated formal proceedings 
against SWIFT—a cooperative owned by 2000 banks which managed 
an international telecommunications network specializing in the 
supply of data transmission and processing services to financial 
institutions around the world—after having received a complaint from 
La Poste (the French Post Office Bank) which had been refused 
access to the network. The Commission sent a statement of objection 
in which it considered that SWIFT had infringed Article 86. During 
                                                            
4. Commission Decision No. 85/202/EEC (Wood Pulp), 1984 O.J. L 085/1.  
5. See Hilti AG, [1991] E.C.R II-1439, ¶ 9.  
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the proceedings, SWIFT offered to grant complete access to any 
entity which met the criteria laid down by the European Monetary 
Institute for admission to domestic payment systems, whereas until 
then such access had been reserved for shareholder members only. 
This commitment was published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities, and the Commission suspended the 
proceedings against SWIFT. The Commission declared its intention 
to ensure that the commitment would be honored.  
That same year, following complaints from suppliers of 
maintenance services against the commercial practices of Digital 
Equipment Corporation (“Digital”), the Commission initiated 
proceedings against the company for infringing Article 86. According 
to the Commission’s press release, the commercial practices of 
Digital “revealed a clear desire to obstruct the ability of independent 
service suppliers to compete with Digital on the markets for 
maintenance services and other, hardware services for Digital 
computers.”6 However, Digital proposed formal commitments 
designed to alter its commercial and pricing policy in the field of 
software maintenance services and other hardware services and the 
case was terminated. 
Also in 1997, the Commission clearly indicated that it saw the 
potential advantages of settlement decisions. In its report for 1997, it 
stated: 
As far as proceedings are concerned, the Commission 
ultimately imposed fines in only one case this year. In the 
remainder, it was able, after the complaint-notification 
stage, to accept from the undertakings involved 
commitments or changes to agreements which put an end to 
the offending practices. The attitude of undertakings 
reveals a genuine willingness to accept the principles of 
competition, but the approach must not be relaxed in future. 
This is why the Commission will continue to see that 
proposed commitments are honoured.7 
The acceptance by the Commission of firms’ commitments, 
however, had a number of drawbacks, the most important of which 
was that the commitments were not binding on the parties except 
when they took the form of conditions attached to an exemption 
                                                            
6. Commission Press Release, IP/97/868 (Oct. 10, 1997) 
7. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVIITH REPORT ON COMPETITION 
POLICY 1997, at 25 (1998). 
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decision. Thus the 1999 Modernization White Paper suggested that 
making such settlements binding on the parties would be a welcome 
improvement to the enforcement toolkit of the Commission.  
II. THE COMMITMENT PROCEDURE IN REGULATION 1/2003 
AND ITS UNEXPECTED SUCCESS 
Two recitals of Regulation 1/2003 pertain to commitment 
decisions and they read: 
(13) Where, in the course of proceedings which might lead 
to an agreement or practice being prohibited, undertakings 
offer the Commission commitments such as to meet its 
concerns, the Commission should be able to adopt 
decisions which make those commitments binding on the 
undertakings concerned. Commitment decisions should 
find that there are no longer grounds for action by the 
Commission without concluding whether or not there has 
been or still is an infringement. Commitment decisions are 
without prejudice to the powers of competition authorities 
and courts of the Member States to make such a finding and 
decide upon the case. Commitment decisions are not 
appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to 
impose a fine. 
(22) Commitment decisions adopted by the Commission do 
not affect the power of the courts and the competition 
authorities of the Member States to apply Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty. 
Article 9 of the Regulation allows the Commission to take 
decisions in order make the commitments offered by firms binding on 
them. It states: 
1. Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision 
requiring that an infringement be brought to an end and the 
undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the 
concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its 
preliminary assessment, the Commission may by decision 
make those commitments binding on the undertakings. 
Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and 
shall conclude that there are no longer grounds for action 
by the Commission. 
2. The Commission may, upon request or on its own 
initiative, reopen the proceedings: 
2015] THE ALROSA JUDGMENT 707 
(a) where there has been a material change in any of 
the facts on which the decision was based; 
(b) where the undertakings concerned act contrary to 
their commitments; or 
(c) where the decision was based on incomplete, 
incorrect or misleading information provided by the 
parties. 
Article 23 of the Regulation 1/2003 allows the Commission to 
impose fines on undertakings and associations of firms which either 
intentionally or negligently fail to comply with a commitment made 
binding by a decision pursuant to Article 9. 
And Article 27 sets the procedural framework for commitment 
decisions and states that: 
4. Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision 
pursuant to Article 9 or Article 10, it shall publish a concise 
summary of the case and the main content of the 
commitments or of the proposed course of action. 
Interested third parties may submit their observations 
within a time limit which is fixed by the Commission in its 
publication and which may not be less than one month. 
Publication shall have regard to the legitimate interest of 
undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
Finally, Article 5 of the Regulation empowers the competition 
authorities of the Member States to apply Articles 81(101) and 
82(102) of the Treaty to individual cases and for this purpose, to 
accept commitments. 
The adoption of this framework for commitment decisions in the 
European Union is, to a large extent, a transplant from the United 
States, albeit an “untailored transplant” according to some critics.8 
Indeed both the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) have the power to accept 
commitments and have made broad use of this possibility. Following 
some public criticism of the commitment procedure, a new 
framework was established in the United States by the Tunney Act of 
1974.  
As in Europe, the procedure for consent decrees in the United 
States involves a public consultation and there is no finding of an 
                                                            
8. See George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on 
U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 971, 973. 
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infringement or admission of guilt by the firms investigated. Also, 
settlement decisions cannot serve as prima facie evidence of an 
infringement in a follow-on case. 
It is, however, worth mentioning that there are several notable 
differences between the US system and the European one. 
At a substantive level, the commitment decisions of the Antitrust 
Division of the Justice Department often impose fines whereas the 
European Commission could not since, as noted previously and 
according to Regulation 1/2003, in the European Union, commitment 
decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends 
to impose a fine. 
In addition, there are also important procedural differences 
which make the US system of commitment decisions more 
transparent than its European counterpart.  
The high level of transparency of the US system of commitment 
decisions is quite important, both because it forces the Department of 
Justice to articulate in great detail the competition issues about which 
it is concerned and the way in which the commitments meet this 
concern. The Department of Justice must file the consent decree with 
a federal district court at least sixty days before the date on which the 
settlement is to take effect. Furthermore, the Justice Department must 
file a competition impact assessment describing the general impact of 
the settlement on competition. This competition impact assessment, 
together with a summary of the consent decree, must be disseminated 
to the public for public comments, and the response of the 
Department of Justice to these comments must be published in the 
Federal Register. By contrast, in the European Union the Commission 
makes very few details about its competition concerns public. Also, it 
does not have to publish a competition impact assessment and it is not 
required to make the answers to the public consultation publicly 
available nor to publish an answer to those public comments.  
Another difference with the European Union lies in the fact that 
in the United States, consent decrees are subject to a judicial review 
process, which was strengthened by the Tunney Act because the 
legislators were concerned that the weakness of the judicial control 
would lead to inequitable consent decrees. The district courts must 
assess whether the consent decree is in the public interest—a notion 
which is not defined, however. But it would seem that, except in rare 
cases, the courts tend to apply a low standard of review.  
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There was little discussion of the provision regarding settlements 
during the period when other provisions of Regulation 1/2003 were 
extensively discussed. This limited interest for Article 9 commitment 
decisions was due to a variety of factors: the fact that commitment 
decisions had rarely been used; the fact that the new provision 
brought significant improvements to the procedural framework in 
which commitment decisions could be implemented; and the fact that 
no one within the Commission or outside the Commission expected 
that commitment decisions would come to play a prominent role in 
competition law enforcement. 
The underlying objective for the adoption of a new procedural 
framework for commitment decisions was to enhance the 
effectiveness of the Commission.  
This goal of streamlining the enforcement process, which 
permeates a number of innovations contained in Regulation 1/2003, 
seemed in line with the mood of a period during which the European 
Commission moved from a formalistic approach to competition law 
enforcement to a “more economics based” approach. This new 
approach included the elimination of block exemptions for vertical 
agreements, the adoption of the significant impediment to effective 
competition (“SIEC”) test for concentration, a wider acceptance of the 
necessity to consider the possible efficiency benefits of the practices 
or transactions examined, and a general acceptance of the desirability 
to move from a formalistic approach to a case by case examination of 
the practices or transactions examined. The view that the goal of 
competition law enforcement was to promote economic efficiency 
and that the process of competition law enforcement itself had to be 
efficient was widely accepted. However, as we shall see later, the 
complementarity between the two goals of moving toward a more 
economic approach to competition and increasing the effectiveness of 
the European Commission turned out to be less than perfect.  
What no one had quite anticipated at the time of the discussion 
of Regulation 1/2003 was that the number of commitment decisions 
would increase as rapidly as it did and that within a few years 
commitment decisions would outnumber enforcement decisions taken 
by the European Commission. The rapid increase in the number of 
commitment decisions was also noticeable in several Member States 
which have adapted their legal frameworks to allow their National 
Competition Authorities to close cases by accepting commitments in 
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conformity with Article 5 of Regulation 1/20039 and have followed 
the practice of the Commission to progressively rely more and more 
on commitment decisions. 
According to Damien Gerard,10 following the adoption of 
Regulation 1/2003 “commitment decisions subsequently emerged as 
the default antitrust enforcement tool in the modernization era and are 
still today ‘becoming increasingly frequent.’” 
Commitment decisions have become common for the majority of 
antitrust cases investigated by the Commission over the past decade. 
During the period from May 2004 to December 2013, 75% (eighteen 
out of twenty-four) of all abuse of dominance cases were resolved 
with commitment. Commissioner Almunia has issued a prohibition 
decision in only one case but has taken ten commitment decisions.11 
  
                                                            
9. Council Regulation No. 1/2003/EC on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2002 O.J. L 1/1 [hereinafter 
Implementation of Competition Rules Regulation]. Article 5 states: “The competition 
authorities of the Member States shall have the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
in individual cases. For this purpose, acting on their own initiative or on a complaint, they may 
take the following decisions: (. . .) — accepting commitments.” 
10. Damien M.B. Gerard, Negotiated remedies in the modernization era: the limits of 
effectiveness, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2013: EFFECTIVE AND LEGITIMATE 
ENFORCEMENT (Ph. Lowe & M. Marquis eds., forthcoming 2013). 
11. See Mario Mariniello, Commitments or Prohibitions? The EU Antitrust Dilemma, 1 
BRUEGEL POLICY BRIEF 2 (2014). 
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 In the following table Damien Gerard shows that a similar 
pattern of increasing use of commitment decisions has developed in a 
number of Member states: 
 
    Table 2 
While there is wide agreement that a commitment decision can 
in some instances be a more efficient way to dispose of a case than an 
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infringement decision because the proposal by the firm(s) involved of 
a suitable commitment allows both the Commission and the parties to 
save resources while at the same time eliminating the competition 
concern raised by the Commission, the rise to prominence of 
commitment decisions in the EU enforcement mechanism has led a 
number of competition law specialists to raise three interdependent 
questions: What could explain the unexpected success of commitment 
decisions? Should the procedural framework of commitment 
decisions in the European Union be improved, given what is known 
about the incentives of the Commission and the parties? Could it be 
that the popularity of commitment decisions raises a systemic issue in 
the EU competition law system?   
III. THE CONTEXT OF COMMITMENT DECISIONS 
It is evident that the success of commitment decisions in the 
European Union is due to the fact that in a large number of cases the 
parties see a number of advantages in proposing commitments to the 
Commission. They seek to avoid the risk of a heavy fine, and of a 
conviction which could facilitate follow-on damage suits. They also 
avoid significant litigation costs, and they may hope to have a say in 
the design of the remedy. The Commission, on the other hand, may 
consider that accepting adequate commitments allows it to terminate 
cases faster than through enforcement (Article 7) decisions and thus 
to save scarce resources that it can devote to other cases while dealing 
adequately with the competition issue raised. Thus it comes as no 
surprise that this win-win solution is adopted as often as possible to 
the benefit of the parties involved and of the competition law 
enforcement system. 
However, the adoption of commitment decisions may also be the 
result of “darker” strategies or of unstated constraints, and their 
adoption may clash with the efficiency goal of competition law. 
A. The Parties’ Incentives to Offer Commitments  
From the standpoint of the parties, one may, first, question 
whether the firms investigated are “free to commit or not to commit” 
as the Commission puts it,12 or whether they are, in fact, “coerced” 
                                                            
12. See European Commission, To Commit or not to Commit? Deciding between 
prohibition and commitments, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y BRIEF 1 (2014) [hereinafter Competition 
Policy Brief].  
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into proposing commitments because they do not have any 
alternative. Second, one may also question whether the parties, when 
they propose commitments, are sufficiently well informed about the 
competition issue that the Commission is concerned about to be able 
to propose adequate commitments—i.e., the least costly way to solve 
the competition issue—or whether imperfect information leads them 
to propose overly broad commitments which are not necessarily the 
least costly solution or the most efficient way to resolve the issue.  
From the point of view of the Commission, one may question 
whether the motivation of the Commission in accepting commitments 
is necessarily and exclusively the desire to save unnecessary costs—
which would be consistent with the efficiency goal. Alternatively, the 
Commission could accept commitments to avoid the effort—or the 
constraint—of formulating well-defined theories of harm, to force an 
interpretation of the law which it has reasons to believe would be 
easily accepted by the European Courts, or to evade the constraints on 
remedies associated with Article 7 enforcement decisions.   
To start with the question of how free firms investigated for 
abuse of dominance are to commit or not commit, two elements must 
be kept in mind. First, it is noticeable that the level of sanctions 
imposed by the Commission, particularly for abuse of dominance,13 
has greatly increased in recent years. 
 
                                                            
13. As seen in Table 3 infra, commitment decisions are particularly frequent in abuse of 
dominance cases. 
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Table 3: Fines for Abuse of Dominance in the European Union 
(1998–2014)14 
Firms Dates Geographical 
Scope 
Starting 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Addition Final 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
AAMS  June 17, 
1998 
Italy ECU 3 100% increase 
due to the long 
ECU 6 
duration, i.e. 13 
years 
ECU 6 
TACA  September 
16, 1998 
Catchment 
areas of the 
ECU 220 
ports in 
Northern 
Europe 
ECU 220 25% increase 
due to the 
duration,  
i.e. 2 to 3 years 
ECU 273 
Virgin—British 
Airways 
July 14, 
1999 
United 
Kingdom 
EU€4 70% increase 
due to the long 
duration, i.e. 7 
years 
EU€6.8 
Soda ash—Solvay December 
13, 2000 
Community 
without 
United 
Kingdom and 
Ireland 
NA  NA  EU€20 
Soda ash—ICI  December 
13, 2000 
United 
Kingdom 
NA  NA  EU€10 
                                                            
14. See Frances Dethmers & Heleen Engelen, Fines Under Article 102 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, 32 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 86 (2011). 
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Firms Dates Geographical 
Scope 
Starting 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Addition Final 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Deutsche Post 
AG  
March 20, 
2001 
Germany EU€12 70% increase 
due to the 
duration  
for the period 
between 1974 
and 
1997 and 30% 
increase for the 
period between 
November 1997 
and October 
2000 
EU€24 
Michelin  June 20, 
2001 
France  EU€8 90% increase 
due to the 
duration,  
i.e. 9 years and 
50% increase 
for 
aggravating 
circumstances 
11 
EU€19.76 
De Post/La Poste  December 
5, 2001 
Belgium EU€2 25% increase 
due to the 
medium 
duration, i.e. 32 
months 
EU€2.5 
 
Deutsche 
Telekom AG  
May 21, 
2003 
Germany EU€10 40% increase 
due to the long 
duration, i.e. > 5 
years and 10% 
reduction 
for mitigating 
circumstances 
EU€12.6 
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Firms Dates Geographical 
Scope 
Starting 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Addition Final 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Wanadoo 
Interactive  
July 16, 
2003 
France EU€9 15% increase 
due to the 
medium  
duration, i.e. 
19.5 months 
EU€10.35 
Microsoft  March 24, 
2004 
EEA EU€165.7 In order to 
ensure a 
sufficient  
deterrent effect, 
the initial 
amount was 
adjusted 
upwards by 
Microsoft 
March 24, 2004 
EEA  
a factor of 2 and 
50% increase 
due to the long 
duration, i.e. 5 
years and 5 
months: 
EU€497 
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Firms Dates Geographical 
Scope 
Starting 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Addition Final 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Compagnie 
Maritime  
Belge 
April 30, 
2004 
Liner services 
between  
Northern 
European 
Ports and 
Zaire 
EU€3 20% or 15% 
increase due to 
the  
medium 
duration of the 
infringements, 
i.e. on average 2 
years and 
reduction of the 
basic amount by 
EUR 50,000 
due to the 
duration 
of the 
proceedings. 
EU€3.4 
Astra Zeneca  June 15, 
2005 
Belgium, 
Denmark 
Germany, the 
Netherlands, 
Norway, 
Sweden, 
UK 
 EU€40 Increase due to 
the duration of  
the 
infringements 
EU€60 
Prokent-Tomra  March 29, 
2006 
Austria, 
Germany, the  
Netherlands, 
Norway, 
Sweden 
EU€16 50% increase 
due to the long 
duration, i.e. 5 
years 
EU€24 
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Firms Dates Geographical 
Scope 
Starting 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Addition Final 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Wanadoo Espana 
v Telefónica 
July 4, 
2007 
Spain EU€90 
 
In order to 
ensure a 
sufficient  
deterrent effect, 
the initial 
amount was 
adjusted 
upwards by 
a factor of 1.25; 
50% increase 
due to the long 
duration, i.e. 5 
years and 4 
months and 
10% reduction 
due to 
mitigating 
circumstances. 
EU€151.9 
Intel  May 13, 
2009 
EEA NA The starting 
amount was 
multiplied by 
5.55 to take 
account of 
its duration, i.e. 
5 years and 3 
months. 
EU€1060 
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Firms Dates Geographical 
Scope 
Starting 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Addition Final 
Amount 
(‘000,000) 
Telekomunikacja 
Polska S.A 
June 22, 
2011 
Poland NA The fine takes 
into account the 
duration and 
gravity of the 
infringement 
and has been 
calculated on 
the basis of the 
average value of 
TP's broadband 
sales between 
2005 and 2009 
in Poland. 
EU€127 
Motorola April 29, 
2014 
Germany  No fines have 
been imposed 
on Motorola 
because there is 
no EU case law 
available on the 
application of 
Article 
102TFEU to 
SEP based 
injunctions, and 
as national 
courts have so 
far reached 
diverging 
conclusions on 
the issue 
EU€0 
 
Besides the fact that sanctions against abuse of dominance have 
been high, no appeal against the substance of an EU decision 
sanctioning an abuse of dominance has been successful in the last ten 
years and practically none in the last thirty years.  
There are two possible types of review of EU decisions imposing 
fines.  
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The first is the possibility of a review of the legality of the 
decision—based on Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (“TFEU” or the “Treaty”)—and a review of the 
fines—based on Article 261 of the TFEU and Article 31 of 
Regulation 1/2003.15 Although the scope of the legality review is 
fairly wide and includes lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty, or 
misuse of power, the scope of remedies is quite limited. If the Court 
finds that the Commission has erred on one of the previously 
mentioned grounds, the courts cannot substitute their interpretation to 
that of the Commission, and they can only annul the Commission’s 
decision and send the case back to the Commission.  
With respect to questions of law and facts, the courts have full 
control and they will review the thoroughness, the relevance, the 
reliability, the consistency, or the comprehensiveness of the 
Commission’s decision. However, when it comes to highly technical 
or economic assessments—which are nearly always at the heart of an 
abuse of dominance decision—the courts limit themselves to 
assessing whether the evidence is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions. In other words, they limit themselves to controlling the 
internal consistency of the decision. This means that they will not 
substitute their own economic or technical assessment to that of the 
Commission and that they will not compare the Commission’s highly 
technical assessment with a competing assessment. This means that 
the Commission’s theories of harm in abuse of dominance cases 
                                                            
15. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
263, 2012 O.J. C 326/162 [hereinafter TFEU]  
“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of 
legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European 
Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the 
European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, 
offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties . . . .” 
 “Regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and 
by the Council, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaties, may give the Court 
of Justice of the European Union unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the 
penalties provided for in such regulations.” Id. art. 261. See Implementation of 
Competition Rules Regulation, supra note 8, art. 31 (“The Court of Justice 
shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the Commission 
has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, reduce or increase 
the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed.” 
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cannot be challenged through reviews of the legality of decisions. 
Yet, as John Ratliff states:  
[I]f using different economic assessments makes a material 
difference to a finding and/or a fine, then clearly the 
decision which assessment is “the valid” one, or “the 
relevant” one in a particular case should be the subject of 
close judicial review. This is just part of assessment of the 
quality of evidence, as the Courts are doing so thoroughly 
with other facts. The Courts should not be deterred from 
carrying out their review of such issues, even if that means 
detailed hearings and calling economic witnesses from both 
sides to court to explain.16 
On the basis of Article 261 of the TFEU and Article 31 of 
Regulation 1/2003, the courts have full jurisdiction to review the fines 
imposed by the Commission—which is the reason most appeals 
against the Commission’s decisions are made on the basis of a 
combination of Article 263 of the TFEU and Article 261 of the 
TFEU. They will make a judgment on the appropriateness of the fines 
and they have a wide scope of remedy at their disposal since they can 
cancel, increase or decrease the fine if they find them inappropriate. 
However, the courts will, for the most part, take a deferential 
approach vis-à-vis Commission decisions. There is some debate—to 
which we will come back later—about whether the courts could use 
the above-mentioned provisions to review—with full jurisdiction—
not only the fines imposed by the Commission but also the decisions 
imposing those fines.  However, so far the courts have not reviewed 
Commission decisions on the basis of Article 261 of the TFEU and 
Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003. 
What this means for firms investigated for a potential abuse of 
dominance is that they know that, if they choose not to offer a 
commitment to the Commission, they expose themselves to the risk 
that the same Commission will sanction them with a very high fine, 
and impose on them at least some of the remedies to which they were 
not willing to commit to and possibly some others, without any real 
chance of being able to contest successfully either the reasoning of 
the Commission or the amount of the fine. Thus, once the 
Commission has expressed concerns about their practices, firms 
investigated for abuse of dominance are in a very uncomfortable 
                                                            
16. JOHN RATLIFF, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EC COMPETITION CASES BEFORE THE 
EUROPEAN COURTS: - AVOIDING DOUBLE RENVOI 12 (2009). 
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position since it is fairly unlikely that the Commission will reverse 
itself or that it will close the case if they do not offer commitments. 
Their only possibility is therefore to offer commitments because not 
offering such commitments is necessarily a losing strategy.  
The situation would be quite different if firms had a reasonable 
possibility of having the courts overturn Commission decisions 
sanctioning them. In that case they would be faced with two options, 
each having its own costs and possible benefits. Not offering 
commitments could be a winning strategy, in spite of the costs 
incurred, if the firms thought that they could make a good case 
against the theory of harm proposed by the commission.  
Overall, one can question whether commitments are concessions 
extracted by the Commission which put the firms under investigation 
in a situation where they do not have the any choice but to modify 
their behavior or whether they are solutions negotiated by the firms 
and the Commission to remedy a competition problem in the most 
efficient way. In the first case, the commitment decisions are akin to 
enforcement decisions; in the second case, commitment decisions 
would resemble contracts between the investigated firms and the 
Commission. Similarly, in the first case the success of the 
commitment procedure in recent years would be, to a large extent, the 
result of choices made by the Commission to bear down on some 
dominant firms with questionable and create a situation where they 
have to offer commitments while in the second case the success of the 
commitment procedure would result from its appeal for firms being 
investigated. 
A number of authors have suggested that the first scenario—(the 
fact that the investigated firms do not really have any other choice but 
to offer commitments)—is in fact the prevalent one. For example 
Philip Marsden, commenting on commitment decisions in high 
technology markets, stated:  
[W]hile defendants technically offer the commitments, the 
reality is often quite different. DG-Competition puts huge 
pressure on firms to come up with solutions to end 
investigations. A dynamic exists where the threat of years 
of investigation with the significant legal and commercial 
costs, distraction of senior management, ongoing negative 
publicity, uncertainty, and possibility of huge fines 
combine to make defendants particularly prone to offer 
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commitments as a practical matter, no matter what the 
theory of harm may be or allegations they are facing.17  
Along the same line, P. Lugard & M. Mollmann state:  
A look at the Antitrust Manual of Procedures published by 
the Commission clearly reveals that it considers itself 
entitled to put commitments on the table: Although the 
commitments are voluntarily submitted by the parties, the 
Commission can make proposals during discussions on 
how to modify certain elements of the text, and may even 
provide concrete drafting proposals on specific issues. It is 
up to the parties to decide whether to accept such proposals. 
(The last phrase may leave a bitter taste for companies that 
have faced this situation.).18 
B. The Commission’s Incentives to Accept Commitments 
If we now turn to the Commission’s incentives, several 
commentators have warned against the risk that the Commission may 
use commitment decisions to pursue a policy insulated from the 
oversight of the courts. For example, Denis Waelbroek warned 
against the development of “a parallel competition policy that 
completely escapes judicial control and the minimum guarantees to 
which our rule of law remains attached.”19 
What fuels those fears is, first, the fact that commitment 
decisions, because they are supposed to reflect commitments 
voluntarily offered by investigated firms, are very unlikely to be 
challenged in court. In most cases the parties would not have the 
incentive to challenge commitment decisions for fear that, if they 
were annulled, the Commission might subsequently adopt an 
infringement commission. Furthermore, the jurisprudential principle 
of “estoppel” may make it difficult for firms that have proposed 
commitments to challenge the decisions making those commitments 
                                                            
17. PHILIP MARSDEN, THE EMPEROR’S CLOTHES LAID BARE: COMMITMENTS 
CREATING THE APPEARANCE OF LAW, WHILE DENYING ACCESS TO LAW 2-3 (CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle, 2013). 
18. P. LUGARD & M. MOLLMANN, The European Commission’s Practice Under Article 
9 Regulation 1/2003: A Commitment A Day Keeps the Court Away 7 (CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle2013). 
19. Denis Waelbroeck, Le développement en droit européen de la concurrence des 
solutions négociées (engagements, clémence, non-contestation des faits et transactions): que 
va-t-il rester aux juges? (The Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series, GCLC 
Working Paper 01/08. 
724 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:701 
binding unless they can prove that they were coerced into proposing 
such commitments.20 Finally, commitment decisions may be difficult 
to challenge by third parties, who would have to show that they are 
directly and specifically affected by the decision. 
The fact that commitment decisions are difficult to appeal may 
be one of the precise reasons why the Commission, eager to further 
insulate itself from the oversight of the Courts, may favor Article 9 
commitment decisions over Article 7 commitment decisions. Indeed, 
the Commission states: “Prohibition decisions are . . . frequently 
challenged before EU Courts, which gives judges the opportunity to 
clarify the law, whereas appeals of Article 9 decisions, including by 
third parties, are rare.”21 
Second, as mentioned earlier, Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 
states that “Commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where 
the Commission intends to impose a fine.” Furthermore, in its policy 
brief just quoted the Commission states: “The Commission is also 
more likely to opt for a prohibition decision if it is important to set a 
legal precedent.” Yet, several apparent inconsistencies in the choice 
of cases ending with Article 9 commitment decisions seem to confirm 
the suspicion that the Commission uses such decisions either when its 
theory of harm is not very robust or, more frequently, when it wants 
to impose conditions which it could not impose using Article 7 
decisions or when it wants to regulate industries. 
A good example of a case offering some insight as to the likely 
motivations of the Commission to favor commitment decisions is the 
Coca-Cola commitment decision of 2005.22 In this decision, the 
commitments offered by Coca-Cola to abstain, until December 2010, 
from entering into exclusive agreements with shops and pubs, from 
offering them target or growth rebates or from forcing them to take 
less popular products with its stronger products, were made binding 
on Coca-Cola in Iceland and Norway and all the EU countries where 
Coca-Cola had a dominant position. One may first wonder why the 
Commission chose a commitment decision in this case since in 
previous cases with practices similar to the practices involved—
                                                            
20. See H. SCHERMERS & D. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 104-108 (Kluwer, 6th ed. 2001). 
21. Competition Policy Brief, supra note 12, at 2. 
22. Commission Decision of 22 June 2005 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 
82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/A.39.116/B2 Coca-
Cola). 
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exclusivity agreements, fidelity rebates, or tying—such as the 
Michelin cases or the British Airways case, the Commission had, in 
the past, chosen to impose fines on this kind of practices.23 But a 
second feature of this decision may explain why the Commission 
decided to issue a commitment decision rather than an infringement 
decision. The Decision states:  
(48) In the territories not served by the three anchor bottlers 
to which this Decision is addressed (Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, parts of Germany, Iceland, Malta, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden), TCCC works with one or 
more other bottlers to produce and market its drinks. In 
relation to these other bottlers, TCCC proposed to ensure 
that, in countries where the commitments are applicable, 
these other bottlers sign the commitments within 90 days of 
notification of this Decision to the Parties. As a result, all 
agreements by those other bottlers will be brought in line 
by the full implementation date in these countries. 
(49) For the countries where the commitments are not 
applicable from the outset, TCCC proposed to ensure that 
bottlers other than the anchor bottlers undertook to comply 
with the commitments in the event that the commitments 
subsequently became applicable because market share 
thresholds for the application of the commitments were 
reached in one or both channels in their respective country. 
(50) TCCC undertook to use its best efforts to attain 
compliance by bottlers other than anchor bottlers. As a 
means of last resort for ensuring the bottlers’ compliance, 
TCCC proposed to commit to terminate the agreements 
with any bottlers that refuse to adhere to the 
commitments.24 
In other words, the settlement negotiated in the context of the 
Coca-Cola decision was made applicable, in countries where the 
market share of Coca-Cola was superior or equal to 40% and more 
than twice the size of the market shares of the next competitor, to 
bottlers which were not parties to the proceedings and was made 
binding in countries where the commitment was not applicable at the 
time of the decision if, in the future, the market share of Coca-Cola in 
                                                            
23. Michelin v. Commission, Case T-203/01, [2003] E.C.R. II-4071; British Airways v. 
Commission, Case C-95/04, [2007] E.C.R. I-2331. 
24. Coca-Cola, supra note 22, ¶¶ 48–50. 
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those countries were to surpass 40% and be more than twice the size 
of the market shares of the next competitor.  
It is clear that, if the Commission had imposed through an 
enforcement decision, remedies having the same scope and reach as 
the commitments offered by Coca-Cola, it would have run two risks: 
the legal risk of re-opening the controversy over whether fidelity 
rebates granted by dominant firms should be considered per se 
violations of Article 102, and the risk of being overturned by the 
courts on procedural grounds and/or for lack of proportionality 
between the remedy and the violation.  
By using a commitment decision, the Commission was able not 
only to restore competition on the investigated national markets 
where Coca-Cola had implemented the restrictive vertical agreements 
about which the Commission was concerned, but also to impose the 
remedies proposed by Coca-cola on firms that were not parties to the 
proceedings and to make these commitments binding on national 
markets the Commission had not had time to investigate.25 Clearly, 
the Commission could not have achieved such a result through an 
enforcement decision without running a serious risk that the courts 
would have found the remedies to be disproportional to the violation.  
There are a number of other cases for which it has been alleged 
that the Commission might have been motivated to adopt a 
commitment decision for reasons not so much related to a concern for 
procedural economy but in order either to avoid the scrutiny of the 
Courts or to be able to accept much broader remedies than it would 
have been able to impose through an (Article 7) enforcement 
decision.  
                                                            
25. It is also suggested by some authors that in the Coca-Cola case, the commitments 
were negotiated before the establishment of a preliminary assessment and that the preliminary 
assessment was ex post tailored to the negotiated settlement. See Denis Waelbroeck, Le 
développement en droit européen de la concurrence des solutions négociées (engagements, 
clémence, non-contestation des faits et transactions): que va-t-il rester aux juges? (The Global 
Competition Law Centre, GCLC Working Paper 01/08);  Dans l'affaire Coca-Cola (n. JOCE, 
n° C 289, 26 novembre 2004, p. 10), les engagements ont été offerts avant toute 
communication des griefs, et même avant toute évaluation préliminaire »; see also Christopher 
J. Cook, Commitment Decisions: The Law and Practice under Article 9, 29 WORLD 
COMPETITION 209, 215-216 (2006); Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions under Art. 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003: The Developing EC Practice and Case Law (EUI Working Papers in 
LAW,  No. 2008/22). 
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For example, between 2004 and 2014 the Commission took 
eleven commitment decisions in the energy sector.26 In four of those 
decisions structural commitments were made binding on the firms 
which had offered them.27 The adoption of structural remedies in four 
commitment decisions in the energy sector over a period of six years 
merits two comments from a legal and a policy point of view.  
From a legal point of view, Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 
states: 
Structural remedies should only be imposed either where 
there is no equally effective behavioral remedy or where 
any equally effective behavioral remedy would be more 
burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the 
structural remedy. Changes to the structure of an 
undertaking as it existed before the infringement was 
committed would only be proportionate where there is a 
                                                            
26. See Commission Decision of 12 April 2006 Relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/B-1/38.348 – REPSOL C.P.P.); 
Commission Decision of 10 November 2007 Relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of 
the EC treaty (Case COMP/B-1/37966 Distrigaz); Commission Decision of 26 November 
2008 Relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC treaty and Article 54 of the 
EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.388 - German Electricity Wholesale Market and 
COMP/39.389 - German Electricity Balancing Market); Commission Decision of 18 March 
2009 Relating to proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA 
Agreement (Case COMP/39.402 – RWE Gas Foreclosure); Commission Decision of 3 
December 2009 Relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.316 – Gaz de 
France); Commission Decision of 17 March 2010 Relating to a proceeding under Article 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement 
(Case COMP/39.386 – Long-term contracts France); Commission Decision of April 4 2010 
Relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case 39351 – Swedish Interconnectors); 
Commission Decision of 4 May 2010 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement(Case 
COMP/39.317 – E.ON Gas); Commission Decision of 29 September 2010 Relating to a 
proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(‘TFEU’) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.315 – ENI); Commission 
Decision 19 June 2012 Relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (COMP/39736 - 
SIEMENS/AREVA); Cez, Electricity , Com 39.727, April 2013.  
27. Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 Relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 82 of the EC treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.388 - 
German Electricity Wholesale Market; Commission Decision of 18 March 2009 Relating to 
proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
COMP/39.402 – RWE Gas Foreclosure) Commission Decision of 29 September 2010 Relating 
to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(‘TFEU’) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement(Case COMP/39.315 – ENI); Cez, Electricity, 
Com 39.727. 
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substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that 
derives from the very structure of the undertaking. 
Article 7 of the Regulation states: “Structural remedies can only 
be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioral 
remedy or where any equally effective behavioral remedy would be 
more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural 
remedy.” Thus, if the Commission can impose structural remedies in 
infringement decisions, it can do so only under very restrictive 
conditions as there is a clear preference for behavioral remedies in 
Regulation 1/2003. This may explain why no structural remedy has 
ever been imposed in an Article 7 decision. The Commission, on the 
other hand, may feel less constrained in Article 9 decisions since 
Article 9 makes no distinction between behavioral and structural 
commitments and since the risk of an appeal against an Article 9 
(commitment) decision is much lower than the risk of an appeal 
against an Article 7 (infringement) decision. Thus it is likely that if 
the Commission seeks structural changes on a market, it will prefer to 
have the investigated firms offer such structural changes as 
commitments rather than trying to impose them through an 
enforcement decision.28  
From the policy point of view, in 2006 the Commission 
completed an inquiry in the energy sector. As the Commission 
describes it:  
After nearly two years of intensive investigation, the 
Commission identified in its final report serious 
shortcomings in the electricity and gas markets, e.g. too 
much market concentration in most national markets, a lack 
                                                            
28. The Commission does not hide its preference for structural remedies, which may 
explain its preference for commitment decisions. In its memo on commitments decisions 
(MEMO/04/217, 17. September 2004, Commitment decisions (Article 9 of Council Regulation 
1/2003 providing for a modernised framework for antitrust scrutiny of company behaviour) it 
states: “There are two types of commitments: Behavioral commitments include a commitment 
by a company to provide certain services or goods under specified conditions. See e.g. 
Commission Decision of 13 December 2011 Relating to proceedings under Article 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
COMP/C-3/39692 – IBM Maintenance Services). Structural commitment includes the 
divestiture of assets, for example of an electricity transmission network. See supra note 24. In 
principle, the Commission can accept both types of commitments. Experience has shown that 
usually structural commitments tend to be more effective than behavioral ones. In each case, 
the Commission will assess whether the commitments proposed by the company effectively 
solve the competition problem identified. The commitments will always be tailored to the 
nature of the competition problem.” 
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of liquidity preventing successful new entry, too little 
integration between Member States’ markets, an absence of 
transparent, available market information leading to distrust 
in the pricing mechanisms, an inadequate current level of 
unbundling between network and supply interests which 
has negative repercussions on market functioning and 
investment incentives, customers being tied to suppliers 
through long-term downstream contracts, and current 
balancing markets and small balancing zones which limit 
competition and thereby ease costs for the final consumer.29 
As a follow-up, the Commission launched a number of 
investigations under the EC Treaty rules, notably Article 82, in the 
electricity and gas markets.  
As is clear from the above quotation, the Commission very much 
wanted to change the structure of the energy sector—both vertically 
and horizontally—as well as contractual relationships between 
suppliers and buyers in order to promote competition in the energy 
sector and used commitment decisions to further this goal. The 
aforementioned report states:  
The Commission has already adopted a landmark decision 
concerning two cases in the electricity sector (the E. ON. 
and the RWE decisions). On the basis of unprecedented 
structural commitments addressing horizontal and vertical 
concerns, (the E. ON) decision is expected to open two 
separate markets to competition. In another key case in the 
gas sector (the RWE case), an undertaking has also 
provided structural commitments to bring the investigation 
to an end. 
Thus the remedies adopted in those cases not only restored 
competition—as is normally the case in prohibition decisions—but 
also sought to modify the future structure of the market to make it 
more competitive and to force the entrance of new competitors. This 
use of the commitment decision to restructure energy markets was all 
the more important because the Commission was encountering stiff 
opposition from Member States in its attempt to push regulatory 
separation.  
                                                            
29. Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
function of Regulation 1/2003, SEC (2009) 574 (final) [hereinafter Commission 
Communication on Regulation 1/2003]. 
 
730 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:701 
Indeed in the Third Internal Energy Market Package, which 
came into force in 2009—and had been negotiated for several years—
the Commission was unable to impose ownership unbundling as the 
sole way to achieve structural separation of network operation from 
production and supply activities. In the Directive 2009/72/EC (the 
“Electricity Directive”) and the Directive 2009/73/EC (the “Gas 
Directive”), ownership unbundling is only one of three options. Two 
other options are allowed: unbundling can also be realized without 
ownership unbundling through the establishment of an independent 
system operator (“ISO”) or an independent transmission operator 
(“ITO”). 
Commenting on the E. ON. case, in which E. ON. had proposed 
to sell its electricity transmission system network to an operator with 
no interests in electricity generation and/or supply businesses and to 
commit to divest a sizeable generation capacity to competitors, Jean-
François Bellis stated: 
The Commission effectively managed to secure from E.ON 
voluntary but legally binding structural commitments 
through competition enforcement at a time when its parallel 
negotiations with Member States on regulatory unbundling 
of their energy companies was struggling.30  
Some commentators have also questioned the motives behind the 
commitment decisions in high tech sectors—such as IT or consumer 
electronics products. Indeed, the Commission has issued a number of 
commitment decisions in this sector such as Microsoft (Tying) (2009), 
Rambus (2009), IBM (Maintenance Services) (2011), and Samsung 
(Essential Patents) (2014). 
Two competing views can be expressed with respect to the 
wisdom of commitment decisions in the high tech sector. On the one 
hand, competition issues in the high tech sector justify swift action 
and remedies tailor-made to the realities of the market because of the 
importance of the innovative process and the fast moving nature of 
these markets. On the other hand, high tech markets are often quite 
complex and novel, which means both that there is a need for 
reviewable enforcement decisions which may then guide economic 
actors on these markets and that interventions—or the acceptance of 
                                                            
30. Jean-François Bellis, Commitment Decisions in Article 102 TFEU Cases – An 
Alternative to Infringement Decisions with Fines? Presentation to the Brussels School of 
Competition (2013). 
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commitments—based on “competition concerns” which are not fully 
articulated may entail a high risk of type I errors. In short, there is 
debate about whether the need for legal precedent should take 
precedence over the need for swift action in such a sector and whether 
the Commission, for strategic reasons, has overused the commitment 
decisions mechanism. 
Competition Commissioner Almunia, who is known to favor 
commitment decisions, has repeatedly stated his belief that 
commitment decisions are appropriate for high tech markets. For 
example in a statement made in 2012 on the Google case he said:  
I believe that these fast-moving markets would particularly 
benefit from a quick resolution of the competition issues 
identified. Restoring competition swiftly to the benefit of 
users at an early stage is always preferable to lengthy 
proceedings, although these sometimes become 
indispensable to competition enforcement. In this case, 
Google Inc. has repeatedly expressed to me its willingness 
to discuss any concerns that the Commission might have 
without having to engage in adversarial proceedings. This 
is why I am today giving Google an opportunity to offer 
remedies to address the concerns we have already 
identified.31 
Yves Botteman and Agapi Patsa extensively discuss the various 
facets of the case for the use of commitment decisions in high tech 
sectors.32 They offer three arguments in favor of commitment 
decisions: 1) As illustrated by Intel, establishing an antitrust violation 
in dynamic and fast evolving markets may be particularly daunting 
and time-consuming for antitrust authorities with the risk that the 
remedies will be obsolete by the time the Commission has made a 
decision; 2) As shown by Microsoft remedies, an infringement 
decision may be prone to implementation problems and, ultimately, 
result in litigation over the defendant’s precise obligations whereas 
this is less likely to happen in case of commitment decisions since the 
commitments will have been offered by the firm investigated; 3) In 
fast-evolving markets with a dynamic competitive process, type I 
                                                            
31. Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for 
Competition Policy, Statement of VP Almunia on the Google Antitrust Investigation (May 21, 
2012). 
32. See Yves Botteman & Agapi Patsa, Towards a More Sustainable Use of Commitment 
Decisions in Article 102 TFEU Cases, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1, 1-28 (2013). 
 
732 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:701 
errors may be more costly than type II errors since the anti-
competitive issue may resolve itself, given the often transitory nature 
of market power in fast-evolving markets. Therefore tailor-made 
commitments (remedies) offered early on by the investigated firm 
may be superior to injunctions in the context of enforcement 
decisions.  
However, the case for the benefits of quick resolution of 
competition issues in high tech markets through the use of 
commitment decisions may be weaker than what Yves Botteman and 
Agapi Patsa suggest, for various reasons.  
The most obvious one is that the time it takes to arrive at 
commitment decisions, particularly in abuse of dominance cases—
high tech cases are predominantly abuses of dominance cases—has 
thus far been not been significantly shorter than the time it takes to 
arrive at enforcement decisions. Thus the alleged rationale of 
“increased effectiveness” of the competition law enforcement system 
does not seem to have a sound basis—in general or in the high tech 
sector—for justifying commitment decisions in this sector. As Mario 
Mariniello explains:  
The key benefit of a commitment decision is arguably to 
provide a quicker response to an ongoing infringement. An 
analysis of the Commission’s decisions generally confirms 
this but also suggests more caution. The time from the 
opening of a proceeding to the adoption of the decision is 
on average 17 percent longer for prohibition decisions than 
commitment decisions: 28.5 versus 24.3 months. This 
changes though if decisions are categorized according to 
the nature of the infringement. Commitment decisions are 
particularly popular in abuse of dominance cases (breaches 
of Article 102 of the EU Treaty). However, in these cases, 
commitment decisions have taken on average longer than 
prohibition decisions: 26 months against 22.7 months. That 
is: cases resulting in commitment decisions have been 15 
percent slower than prohibitions. While this surprising 
result could be due to the lack of statistically significant 
figures (there have been only six Article 102 prohibition 
decisions since May 2004, and it cannot be excluded that a 
prohibition was adopted in those cases exactly because it 
was believed that they would not require a long 
investigation), it nevertheless suggests that the greater 
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speed normally attributed to commitment decisions is not to 
be taken for granted.33 
The skepticism about the fact that in high tech abuse of 
dominance cases commitment decisions are faster than enforcement is 
particularly topical in the Google case which was initiated in 
November 2010 and has not yet reached the decision stage. In any 
case, the benefits, in term of increased effectiveness of the 
Commission, of commitment decisions in high tech sectors seem to 
be, at best, modest.34 
Furthermore, in their defense of commitment decisions in high 
tech sectors, Bottemans and Patsa assume that the incentives of the 
Commission are strictly to remedy the competitive concerns raised by 
potentially anti-competitive behavior, that the theory of harm 
underlying the competitive concern is clearly articulated in the 
preliminary assessment, and that the investigated firms have the 
choice to offer or not to offer commitments. For reasons discussed 
previously, there are reasons to doubt that this is an accurate 
description of the commitment process in general and in the high tech 
sector in particular. Because the competitive issues raised are often 
new and particularly complex and the law is uncertain, the risk of 
type I errors is particularly high in the high tech sector. Philip 
Marsden addresses these issue when he states that: 
When commitments decisions espouse novel theories of 
harm in fast-moving markets, they create important 
precedents, considered relevant by the industry as a whole 
who otherwise have little direct relevant case law or 
Commission guidance. However, with little pressure on the 
Commission to provide a well reasoned and evidenced 
decision when commitments are given, rules can end up 
being set for an industry based only on case-specific facts 
and the interactions of a case team, a defendant, and at most 
some self-interested third parties.35 
Thus for the Commission the desire to intervene actively and 
without facing the risk of an appeal or the constraints of an 
                                                            
33. See Mariniello, supra note 11. 
34. There are exceptions, however. The Universal International Music/MCPS case took 
less than eight months. 
35. PHILIP MARSDEN, THE EMPEROR’S CLOTHES LAID BARE: COMMITMENTS 
CREATING THE APPEARANCE OF LAW, WHILE DENYING ACCESS TO LAW 4 (CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle, 2013). 
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enforcement decision, even at the cost of maintaining a degree of 
legal unpredictability, may be a more important determinant of the 
choice of commitment decisions in the high tech sector than the desire 
to save resources.  
Finally, there is a hypothesis worth mentioning to explain the 
intensive use of commitment decisions by the Commission, 
particularly in the area of abuse of dominance. As we know, the 
pressure on the European Union to follow a “more economic 
approach” to antitrust enforcement in the area of Article 82 has grown 
regularly over the past decade. The publication of the Economic 
Advisory Group On Competition Policy Report on “an economic 
approach to Article 82” in 2005 was followed by the publication in 
2009 of the Commission Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings,36 which officialized 
this evolution. But the Commission, like all competition authorities, 
has found over time that the economic approach to abuses of 
dominance is particularly challenging. It is much more difficult and 
much more resource intensive to establish the proof of an abuse of 
dominance when one follows an economic approach than when one 
follows a more legalistic approach to competition law enforcement.  
Mario Merinello37 examines the decisions published (English 
versions) between May 2004 and December 2013, and compares the 
average length of commitment decisions—twenty-one pages—with 
the average length for prohibition decisions—160 pages. As an 
illustrative example, he compares the commitment decision in 
Rambus—seventeen pages, four of which are dedicated to the 
“practices raising concerns”—and the Intel prohibition—518 pages, 
225 of which are dedicated to the analysis of the abuse of dominance 
of Intel). 
Commitment decisions offer an easy way to bypass both the 
complexity of articulating a theory of harm that would withstand the 
scrutiny of courts and economic experts and the risk that there would 
be a court challenge to the decision.  
The reason commitment decisions are both shorter and easier for 
the Commission is that in commitment decisions, the Commission 
                                                            
36. See Commission Communication—Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by 
Dominant Undertakings; Commission Communication on Regulation 1/2003, supra note 29.  
37. See Mariniello, supra note 10. 
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does not spell out the full details of the theory of harm that led it to 
believe that the behavior implemented by the company is harmful for 
consumers.  
As Botteman and Patsa say: “The EC may prefer to obtain early 
voluntary concessions to spending more time and effort on a case that 
may progressively reveal evidentiary and theoretical weaknesses, 
thereby depriving the EC and the market of any antitrust remedy.”38 
In 2004 John Temple Lang expressed the same idea in detailing the 
Commission’s reasons for considering commitments.39 Among other 
reasons, he stated: 
The Commission is aware that the law under Article 82 is 
unclear, and even interpretative guidelines may not succeed 
in clarifying it. Rather than have a long and difficult 
Commission procedure and a case in the Court of First 
Instance, with an uncertain result, the Commission should 
be satisfied to obtain a commitment which will 
immediately make the market more competitive. 
Yet using commitment decisions in complex cases in which the 
law is not clear in order to avoid the difficulties and the costs of 
elaborating a robust theory of harm or in order to reduce the chances 
of an appeal can run against the public interest for a variety of 
reasons: commitment decisions do not have the dissuasive effect of 
prohibition decisions; aggrieved parties cannot rely on them to bring 
damage claims; and they prevent the development of a coherent 
jurisprudence through court reviews which could offer legal 
predictability. This is a heavy social cost, which should be compared 
to the private benefits to the Commission and the firms concerned of 
having simpler and less costly decisions.  
Altogether, uneasiness about the risk that the Commission could 
misuse or overuse commitment decisions exists because of problems 
at three levels: the lack of clear procedural arrangements for the 
adoption of commitment decisions in Regulation 1/2003, practices of 
the Commission which do not seem to be always in line with 
Regulation 1/2003 or with the basic principles of the rights of 
defendants, and lack of oversight of the substance of enforcement 
decisions by the Courts. 
                                                            
38. See Botteman & Patsa, supra note 32. 
39. John Temple Lang, Commitment Decisions and Settlements with Antitrust 
Authorities and Private Parties under the European Antitrust Law, in CORP. L. INST., INT'L 
ANTITRUST L. &  POL.,  274–76 (Barry Hawk ed., 2006). 
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Clearly the provisions of Regulation 1/2003 regarding 
commitment decisions do not provide for a level of transparency of 
the process leading to commitment decision that would adequately 
protect the firms investigated and prevent misuse or overuse of the 
procedure.40 No standard is set for the “competition concerns” which 
the Commission can invoke in its preliminary assessment. No 
provision allows the defendants and to contest the competition 
concerns raised by the Commission before entering into the 
commitment negotiation phase. No indication is given in the 
Regulation on how the proportionality principle should apply to the 
commitments sought or accepted by the Commission, which allows 
the Commission to request commitments which go beyond the 
elimination of anticompetitive practices but modify the structure of 
the market. The question of whether commitment decisions by the 
parties can be appealed is open to controversy.  
Furthermore, the practice of the Commission may not always be 
in line with the principles set out in Regulation 1/2003 or the 
procedural rights of defendants. There appears to be evidence that in 
certain cases the remedies are negotiated before the preliminary 
concerns of the Commission are formulated, which seems to 
contradict both Recital 13 and Article 9.1 of Regulation 1/2003. In 
such cases it is difficult to see how the commitment can meet 
concerns which have not yet been articulated.41 Equally, in spite of 
the fact that Recital 13 of the Regulation 1/2003 states that 
“Commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where the 
Commission intends to impose a fine.” The Commission seems to use 
commitment decisions for cases for which it has imposed fines in 
                                                            
40. See, e.g., Memorandum from Eur. Comm’n on Antitrust: Commitment Decisions – 
Frequently Asked Questions 2 (Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-189_en.htm. The Commission states:  
The Commission then market tests the offered commitments. A notice is 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union with a concise 
summary of the case and the main content of the commitments. Depending on 
the results of the market test, undertaking(s) may amend the commitments 
before the Commission makes them binding through a commitment decision. 
Id.  
One of the issues is the extent to which the defendants can have access to the answers 
given during the market test. 
41. The [Preliminary Assessment] serves as a basis for the parties to put forward 
appropriate commitments or to better define previously discussed commitments.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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similar previous cases and threatens to impose fines unless the 
commitments offered by the firms investigated meet its approval. 
Finally, as long as the standards of review of European Courts 
for the substance of enforcement decisions are as low as they 
presently are, investigated firms have no real choice but to offer 
commitments to solve the case against them because the Commission 
will, in any case, have the final say. 
IV. THE ALROSA JUDGMENT 
Having extensively discussed the broad context of commitment 
decisions and the concerns which have been raised about the 
possibility of misuse of the procedure, we now turn to the Alrosa 
judgment.42 This judgment is particularly important for two reasons. 
First, it is the first judgment of the European Court of Justice on a 
commitment decision; second, the judgment was rendered in 2010 at 
a time when most of the controversial issues about commitment 
decisions which we have mentioned had already been publicly 
discussed for some time. It is therefore of interest to see whether the 
Court of Justice was willing and able to deal with the challenges 
mentioned previously—granted that the Court was limited by the 
arguments of the parties—and what are the practical consequences of 
this judgment on the future of commitment decisions. 
We shall, first, briefly summarize the facts and the commitment 
decision of the European Commission before commenting on the 
Court of First Instance (General Court) (“CFI”) and the European 
Court of Justice Judgments. 
A. Facts of the Case 
De Beers is the largest rough diamond supplier in the world with 
a market share of more than 40%. Alrosa, a Russian state-owned 
entity, is the second largest diamond mining company in the world, 
accounting for over 98% of Russian diamond production.  
On March 5, 2002, De Beers and Alrosa, in accordance with 
Articles 2 and 4 of Regulation No 17 of February 6, 1962, jointly 
applied to the Commission for negative clearance or, failing this, an 
individual exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty in respect 
                                                            
42. Case C 441/07 P, Alrosa v. Comm’n [2010] E.C.R. I-05949.   
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of a Trade Agreement, which was concluded in the context of 
longstanding trading relations between Alrosa and De Beers, and 
pursuant to which Alrosa would provide for five years a fixed supply 
of rough diamonds to De Beers for a value of US$800 million 
(EU€640 million) per annum. Alrosa had the option to reduce the 
amount of diamonds sold to De Beers to US$700 million during the 
last two years of the agreement. The diamonds sold to De Beers 
amounted roughly to 50% of Alrosa’s production and to 100% of its 
exports out of the Commonwealth of Independent States (“CIS”), 
formerly the Soviet Union. 
On January 15, 2003 the Commission opened proceedings under 
Articles 81(101) and 82(102) of the EC Treaty—which deal with 
restrictive business practices and abuse of dominance—by sending 
two statements of objections under similar case numbers—COMP/E-
3/38.381 and COMP/E-2/38.381. The first statement of objection was 
addressed to De Beers and Alrosa and raised concerns about collusion 
under Article (81)101 of the TFEU. The second statement of 
objection was sent to De Beers only and raised concerns about a 
possible abuse of a dominant position under Article 102.  
In the statements of objection sent to De Beers, the Commission 
considered that the relevant market was the worldwide market for 
rough diamonds. It took the view that De Beers, which until a few 
years before the investigation began accounted for over 80% of the 
worldwide supply of rough diamonds, held a dominant position on the 
worldwide rough diamonds market for a variety of reasons. It 
controlled the market by imposing quotas on its production partners 
and by keeping large stocks; it was still considered the price leader of 
the diamond industry at the time of the investigation; and it was 
protected by high barriers to entry because of the cost and difficulty 
of discovering and exploiting new diamond mines. 
The Commission argued in its statements of objection that its 
investigation had shown that De Beers and Alrosa had established 
their long-lasting trade relationship in order to jointly regulate 
volume, assortment, and prices for rough diamonds sold on the world 
market. It then considered that the exclusive supply commitment laid 
down in the trade agreement between De Beers and Alrosa would 
result in strengthening De Beers' market power by excluding Alrosa 
from the market for the supply of rough diamonds and, consequently, 
that it would deprive other purchasers of access to the significant 
source of supply which Alrosa represented. The Commission was of 
2015] THE ALROSA JUDGMENT 739 
the opinion, on the one hand, that De Beers’ continuous purchase 
relationship with Alrosa constituted a recourse to methods 
inconsistent with normal competition and having an anticompetitive 
effect—in violation of Article 82(102). The Commission also 
believed that the notified Trade Agreement would lead to de facto 
distribution exclusivity to the benefit of De Beers, and as a 
consequence, De Beers would eliminate an alternative and 
independent source of supply for potential customers in violation of 
Article 81(101). 
In March 2003 De Beers and Alrosa produced a joint reply to the 
Article 81 EC Statement of Objection (“SO”), and De Beers replied 
separately to the Article 82 EC SO. An oral hearing took place in July 
2003. 
On September 12, 2003 Alrosa offered individual commitments, 
inter alia, to stop selling to De Beers as of 2013, but it later withdrew 
these commitments because they were not viable from a business 
perspective. 
With the entry into force of Regulation No 1/2003 on May 1, 
2004, the application made by De Beers and Alrosa lapsed in 
accordance with Article 34(1) of that Regulation. However, in 
accordance with Article 34(2) of that Regulation, the initiation of 
proceedings under Article 9(3) of Regulation No 17 by the 
Commission Decision of January 14, 2003, which corresponds to that 
existing under Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 
773/2004 of April 7, 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by 
the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Articles 53 and 54 of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) 
Agreement, which continued to have effect. 
On December 14, 2005 De Beers submitted the “De Beers 
Individual Commitments” in response to the Commission’s request 
and the statements of objections pursuant to Article 82(102) of the EC 
Treaty.43  
On January 25, 2006 De Beers SA submitted an amended 
commitment proposal. The commitment then offered by De Beers—
and accepted by the Commission—was that De Beers would 
                                                            
43. The statements of objections were deemed to constitute the preliminary assessment 
within the meaning of Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. See Commission Decision No. 
2006/520/EC (Alrosa), 2006 O.J. L 205/24. 
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completely phase out its purchasing relationship with Alrosa over a 
three-year period. 
On January 26, 2006 these individual commitments were 
forwarded by the Commission to Alrosa, together with an invitation 
to submit comments.  
On February 6, 2006 Alrosa presented observations on the 
individual commitments proposed by De Beers and raised questions 
about the access to the file and the rights of the defense, in particular, 
the right to be heard.  
On February 22, 2006 the Commission adopted its commitment 
decision making the De Beers Individual Commitments binding on 
De Beers.44 
This description of the case suggests a few commentaries. First, 
the Commission’s aim was to ensure that a contract between De Beers 
and Alrosa, which had voluntarily been brought to the attention of the 
Commission by the parties in order to obtain an exemption, would not 
restrict competition. From that point of view the case fitted the object 
of commitment decisions as stated in Regulation 1/2003: “to bring an 
infringement to an end” where fines are not appropriate. The fact that 
the case was solved through a commitment decision shows the close 
relationship between what used to be exemption decisions under 
Regulation 17/63 and the new regime of commitment decisions.  
Second, the competition issue raised in this case was new 
because there was no jurisprudence on the conditions under which 
supply contracts of firms holding a dominant position with one of 
their competitors could lead to foreclosure. As we have already seen, 
one of the questions debated in the legal literature is whether such 
novel cases should lead to commitment decisions or whether they 
should be adjudicated through infringement decisions in order to 
develop an explicit jurisprudence under the oversight of the Courts. 
This was not the course of action chosen by the Commission and the 
decision does not offer a complete framework of analysis of the 
foreclosure effects of such agreements. Some of the issues which 
were raised in the appeal against the decision are linked to the lack of 
precision of the theory of harm in the commitment decision. 
Third, the case shows the active role the Commission plays in 
the negotiation of commitments voluntarily offered by the 
                                                            
44. See id. (relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 [EC] and Article 54 of the 
EEA Agreement). 
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investigated firms. Indeed, after the failed market test of the joint 
commitment, the Commission, as it acknowledges in paragraph 42 of 
its decision,45 requested a commitment from the parties to cease all 
commercial transactions between them. 
Fourth, the Commission had four possibilities at its disposal to 
solve the competition problem raised by the Alrosa/De Beers trade 
agreement. It could have issued an infringement decision—with or 
without a fine46—with an injunction for violation of Article 81(101), 
or an infringement decision—with or without a fine—with an 
injunction for violation of Article 82(102); it could have accepted a 
commitment decision on the basis of preliminary concerns regarding 
a possible violation of Article 81(101).  
The possibility of choosing an action on the basis of 
Article 81(101) or Article 82(102) comes from the fact that a 
horizontal or vertical agreement entered into by a dominant firm with 
another firm—whether a trade agreement between two competitors, 
as in the present case, between a supplier and a customer, or between 
a patent holder having market power and a generic producer, etc.—
could, in most cases, be scrutinized either as a unilateral act of the 
dominant firm or as an agreement between the dominant firm and its 
competitors.  
In the end, the choice of the legal basis was dictated by the fact 
that because of the opposition of Alrosa to the commitment requested 
by the Commission after the failed market test of the original joint 
commitment, an action on the basis of Article 81 would necessarily 
have implied an enforcement decision with an injunction on the 
parties to discontinue all sales from Alrosa to De Beers, and a near 
certain appeal on the part of Alrosa which could have raised a 
proportionality issue on review since Recital of Regulation 1/2003 
states: “This Regulation should make explicit provision for the 
Commission's power to impose any remedy, whether behavioral or 
structural, which is necessary to bring the infringement effectively to 
amend, having regard to the principle of proportionality.” It could 
have been difficult for the Commission—which had initially 
                                                            
45. Id. (“These observations, together with the Commission’s own analysis, led the 
Commission to suggest amendments to the proposed commitments.”) 
46. Indeed the second sentence of Recital 11 of Regulation 1/2003 states: “Provided 
there is a legitimate interest in doing so, the Commission should also be able to adopt 
decisions which find that an infringement has been committed in the past even if it does not 
impose a fine.” Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of Rules on Competition 
Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2002 O.J. L 001. 
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considered that the sale of by Alrosa to De Beers of diamonds worth 
US$275 million per year would meet its competition concern—to 
justify that the complete cessation of all commercial transactions for 
an indefinite period was the minimum remedy acceptable to alleviate 
the competition problem identified.47  
Once the choice was made to act on the basis of Article 82(102), 
the choice between an enforcement decision and a commitment 
decision against Alrosa depended partly on the desire of the 
Commission not to issue an enforcement decision with an injunction 
because such a course of action could have allowed Alrosa to 
challenge the proportionality of the remedy and partly on the fact that 
De Beers was willing to offer a commitment to cease to buy any 
diamond from Alrosa. 
The question of the proportionality of the remedy to the 
competition problem raised by the agreement between De Beers and 
Alrosa was therefore central to the choice both of the substantive 
ground chosen and the type of decisions chosen.  
B. The Court of First Instance (General Court) Appraisal  
Alrosa promptly appealed the EC commitment decision on June 
29, 2006 to have it annulled. The CFI Judgment dealt with three 
questions: 
1. Did Alrosa have standing to appeal a decision in a case in 
which it was not a party—the Commitment decision was based 
on concerns raised about a possible infringement by De Beers of 
its dominant position? 
2. Was the commitment that was imposed by the Commission 
excessive and in breach of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, 
Article 82 EC—in breach of contractual freedom and of the 
principle of proportionality? 
3. Did the Commission infringe Alrosa’s right to be heard? 
The CFI examined the question of whether the decision, of 
which Alrosa was not an addressee, was of direct and individual 
concern to it, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 
230 of the EC.48 The CFI found that the decision produced a direct 
                                                            
47. Commission Press Release, IP/06/204, Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 22, 2006).  
48. The fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC states:“Any natural or legal person may, 
under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or 
against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to 
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and immediate effect on Alrosa in so far as it restricted the ability of 
De Beers to obtain supplies of rough diamonds from Alrosa. 
Therefore the CFI concluded that Alrosa was directly concerned by 
the decision. It also found that Alrosa was individually concerned by 
the decision inasmuch as it was adopted at the conclusion of 
proceedings in which Alrosa participated to a decisive extent.  
Having found that Alrosa had standing, the main issue discussed 
in the CFI judgment—which deserves a commentary—is the second 
issue—i.e., whether the commitment was excessive and in breach of 
the principle of proportionality). 
The starting point of the CFI is that “[s]ince offers made by 
undertakings are themselves without binding legal effect, it is the 
decision of the Commission taken under Article 9 of Regulation No 
1/2003, and that decision alone, which has legal consequences for the 
undertakings.”49 Second, the CFI found that the commitment 
decisions cannot be considered to be the result of a freely negotiated 
agreement between the Commission and the proponent of the 
commitment. It is an administrative enforcement decision. The CFI 
states in this regard: 
Because the effect of that decision is to bring to an end the 
proceedings to establish and penalise an infringement of the 
competition rules, it cannot be considered as being a mere 
acceptance on the Commission's part of a proposal that has 
been freely put forward by a negotiating partner, but 
constitutes a binding measure which puts an end to an 
infringement or a potential infringement, as regards which 
the Commission exercises all the prerogatives conferred on 
it by Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, with the only distinctive 
feature being that the submission of offers of commitments 
by the undertakings concerned means that the Commission 
is not required to pursue the regulatory procedure laid down 
under Article 85 EC and, in particular, to prove the 
infringement.50 
Third, the CFI considers that “the objective of Article 7(1) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 is the same as that of Article 9(1) of that 
regulation and is indissociable from the main objective of Regulation 
                                                                                                                                     
another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.” Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 230, 2002 O.J. C 325/33. 
49. Cf. Alrosa v. Comm’n, Case T-170/06, [2007] E.C.R. II-2607, ¶ 86. 
50. Id. ¶ 87. 
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No 1/2003, which is to ensure the effective application of the 
competition rules laid down under the Treaty.”51 If the Commission 
has a margin of discretion in the way it can ensure the effective 
application of the competition rules since it can choose an Article 7 
infringement decision or an Article 9 commitment decision, then: “the 
existence of that margin of discretion as to the choice of procedure to 
be followed does not relieve the Commission of the obligation to 
comply with the principle of proportionality when it decides to make 
commitments offered under Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 
binding.”52  
Fourth, the content of the principle of proportionality which 
applies equally to Article 7 (infringement) decisions or to Article 9 
(commitment) decisions have the same objective that: 
[R]equires that the measures adopted by Community 
institutions must not exceed what is appropriate and 
necessary for attaining the objective pursued (Case T-
260/94 Air Inter v Commission [1997] ECR II-997, 
paragraph 144, and Van den Bergh Foods v Commission, 
paragraph 201); when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least 
onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued (Case 265/87 Schräder 
[1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 21, and Case C-174/05 Zuid- 
Hollandse Milieufederatie and Natuur en Milieu [2006] 
ECR I-2443, paragraph 28).53 
The Commission did not deny that the proportionality principle 
applied to Article 9 decisions or that it had a duty to reject 
commitments offered by the parties which were “manifestly 
                                                            
51. Id. ¶ 96. 
52. Id. ¶ 97. 
53. Id. ¶ 98. Some authors have expressed reservations about the parallel drawn by the 
Court of First Instance (General Court) between the infringement and commitment decisions. 
For example Damien Gerard considers that “commitment and infringement decisions differ 
inasmuch as the former do not entail a finding of infringement but aim to address concerns at 
the end of an, ideally, collaborative learning process.” Negotiated Remedies in the 
Modernization Era: the Limits of Effectiveness, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 
2013: EFFECTIVE AND LEGITIMATE ENFORCEMENT (Ph. Lowe & M. Marquis eds., 2013). 
Damien Gerard, however, considers that it would not be unacceptable for the Commission to 
have more flexibility in the application of the proportionality principle if due process 
safeguards, a mandatory judicial review over the entry of commitment decisions and an 
effective review process of the substance of infringement decisions and of the commitment 
decisions were in place. But he acknowledges that those conditions are far from being met in 
the current system. Id. 
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excessive”54 but it argued that the proportionality principle should be 
applied differently under Article 7(1) and under Article 9(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003 because of the “specific nature” of Article 9(1), 
which allows the Commission to terminate a case, without making a 
finding of infringement, when the undertakings concerned have 
voluntarily offered commitments which meet the competition 
concerns of the Commission. The Commission argued that the 
specific nature of Article 9(2) implies that there is no need to base 
such a decision on a statement of reasons such as that required for a 
decision pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003, “in particular 
where it proves difficult to determine the nature or extent of the 
commitment necessary to meet the concerns expressed by the 
Commission.”55 Furthermore, the Commission argued that if the 
proportionality principle were to be applied in the same way to 
Article 7 and Article 9(2) decisions, “the Commission would have to 
carry out an assessment in Article 9 decisions, as for a decision taken 
pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003, and would thus forego 
a part of the efficiency gains which the legislature sought to obtain 
through Article 9 of that regulation.”56  
Those arguments were clearly and strongly rejected by the Court 
of First Instance (General Court) which then carefully delineated what 
the Commission was expected to provide in Article 9 decisions and 
how the principle of proportionality should be applied to such 
decisions. The Court of First Instance stated:  
In cases to which Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 
applies, the Commission has to establish the existence of an 
infringement, which implies a clear definition of the 
relevant market and, where relevant, of the abuse for which 
the undertaking in question is alleged to be responsible. It is 
true that, under Article 9(1) of that regulation, the 
Commission is not required formally to establish the 
existence of an infringement, as, moreover, recital 13 in the 
preamble to Regulation No 1/2003 indicates, but it must 
none the less establish the reality of the competition 
concerns which justified its envisaging the adoption of a 
decision under Articles 81 EC and 82 EC and which allow 
it to require the undertaking concerned to comply with 
certain commitments. This presupposes an analysis of the 
                                                            
54. Alrosa, [2007] E.C.R. II-2607, ¶ 80. 
55. Id. ¶ 78. 
56. Id. 
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market and an identification of the infringement envisaged 
which are less definitive than those which are required for 
the application of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, 
although they should be sufficient to allow a review of the 
appropriateness of the commitment.57 
Fifth, with regard to the proportionality of the commitment, the 
Court of First Instance stated that the test was the same as for 
enforcement decisions: is the commitment appropriate and necessary 
to eliminate the competition concern identified by the Commission? It 
also stated: 
[W]hen there is a choice between several appropriate 
measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and 
the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to 
the aims pursued (Case 265/87 Schräder [1989] ECR 2237, 
paragraph 21, and Case C-174/05 Zuid-Hollandse 
Milieufederatie and Natuur en Milieu [2006] ECR I-2443, 
paragraph 28).58  
The Court of First Instance then concluded that: 
It follows that the Commission cannot, without going 
beyond the powers conferred on it both by the competition 
rules of the EC Treaty and by Regulation No 1/2003, adopt 
on the basis of Article 7(1) of that regulation a decision 
prohibiting absolutely any future trading relations between 
two undertakings unless such a decision is necessary to re-
establish the situation which existed prior to the 
infringement (see, to that effect, Case T-24/90 Automec v 
Commission [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraphs 51 and 52). 59 
Sixth, a further discussion concerned the standard that the Court 
of First Instance (General Court) should use to assess whether the 
commitment proposed by De Beers and made binding by the 
Commission was appropriate, necessary, and the least onerous of the 
commitments which could have met the Commission’s concern.  
The Commission argued that the judicial review of commitment 
decisions should be limited:  
[T]o verifying whether or not there has been a manifest 
breach of the principle of proportionality and, more 
generally, whether or not there has been a manifest error in 
                                                            
57. Id. ¶ 100. 
58. Id. ¶ 98. 
59. Id. ¶ 103. 
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the complex economic assessment carried out to determine 
whether the commitments offered by the undertakings 
concerned meet the concerns expressed in the preliminary 
assessment.60 
The Court of First Instance disagreed with the Commission on 
the question of whether commitment decisions, by nature, involved 
complex technical or economical assessment. The Court of First 
Instance noted61 that the Commission had admitted that in accepting 
the commitment proposed by De Beers it had not engaged in a 
complex economic assessment to compare various possible 
alternative commitments in order to assess which one was least 
costly. Consequently, the Court of First Instance concluded that it did 
not have to limit itself to a manifest error of appreciation standard in 
reviewing the proportionality of the commitment made binding.62 
Seventh, the Court of First Instance, applying the same 
proportionality test as the one used for enforcement decisions, found 
that the total cessation of the commercial relationship between De 
Beers and Alrosa was not necessary to avoid the foreclosure effect, 
and the horizontal restriction to competition of the trade agreement 
between De Beers and Alrosa. The Court of First Instance stated: 
Prima facie, the most appropriate way of bringing an abuse 
of this kind to an end would therefore have been to prohibit 
the parties from entering into any agreement allowing De 
Beers to reserve to itself the whole, or even a material part, 
of Alrosa’s production exported outside the CIS, in order 
for Alrosa to re-establish its independence on the market 
and for third-party access to an alternative source of supply 
to be guaranteed, without it being necessary to prohibit all 
purchases by De Beers of diamonds produced by Alrosa.63 
Finally, the Court of First Instance (the General Court) dealt 
with the question of whether the rights of Alrosa—which was not a 
party to the Article 82 proceedings which led to the commitment 
decision but was a party to the Article 81 proceedings and had, in that 
capacity, submitted a joint commitment with De Beers which had 
been rejected by the Commission—had been violated by the 
Commission. It considered that Alrosa should have been accorded the 
                                                            
60. Id. ¶ 81. 
61. Id. ¶ 123. 
62. Id. ¶ 125. 
63. Id. ¶ 128. 
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rights given to an “undertaking concerned,” because it was De Beers’ 
contracting partner in the trade agreement which the Commission was 
reviewing, because it was an undertaking concerned in the Article 81 
EC case and because of its involvement in the joint commitment 
proposal. The Court of First Instance then found that Alrosa had, in 
the circumstances of the case:  
[A] right to be heard on the individual commitments 
proposed by De Beers which the Commission envisaged 
making binding in the proceedings initiated under Article 
82 EC and that it was not given the opportunity to exercise 
that right fully, even though the extent to which such an 
irregularity might have affected the Commission's decision 
cannot be precisely determined in the present case.64 
The judgment of the Court of First Instance directly or indirectly 
addressed some of the concerns which had been aired in the literature 
on the procedure for commitment decisions. In particular, the 
judgment touches on the concern that investigated firms, which are 
under pressure to avoid an enforcement decision, may be prone to 
propose overly broad commitments; the concern that the 
Commission’s preliminary assessments should not be so imprecise as 
to prevent the Court from exercising its proportionality test; the 
concern that the Commission may pursue a regulatory agenda that it 
could not pursue in the context of Article 7 decisions; the concern that 
the reviewing courts adopt an excessively low standard of review; and 
a concern about the procedural rights of third parties.65 
                                                            
64. Id. ¶ 203. 
65. Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions Under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The 
Developing EC Practice and Case Law, (Eur. Univ. Inst. Dep’t of Law, EUI Working Papers 
LAW 2008/22). Schweitzer underlines the usefulness of the Court of First Instance decision 
when she states: 
“Before the CFI handed down the Alrosa judgment, it was completely unclear 
within which legal limits the Commission could decide to make commitments 
binding – and whether there were any such limits at all. How seriously must 
the Commission investigate competition infringements, and how precisely 
must it define its competitive concern, before entering into commitment 
negotiations? What information must the “preliminary assessment” entail, as 
compared to a full “statement of objection” which is required in an 
infringement proceeding under Art. 7(1) of Reg. 1/2003? Can the Commission 
accept, and make binding, any commitments that the undertakings concerned 
voluntarily offer, or does it have to inquire into the proportionality of the 
commitments? If so, how intense does this analysis have to be? Can the 
Commission make binding commitments in geographic or product markets that 
did not form part of its investigation–as apparently happened in the Coca-Cola 
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First, there is a recognition that commitment decisions are 
administrative decisions similar to Article 7 enforcement decisions 
rather than simply reflecting an agreement freely negotiated between 
the Commission and the firm offering a commitment. Second, the 
Court of First Instance judgment implies that the Commission cannot 
use the commitment decision to push a regulatory agenda by 
accepting structural—or behavioral—commitments that it could not 
have obtained through Article 7 enforcement decisions for lack of 
proportionality. Third, the judgment makes it clear that commitment 
decisions must include an analytical framework which is sufficiently 
developed to allow an effective judicial review of the proportionality 
of the measure adopted. This requires the Commission to have 
delineated the market and to have a clear view of the theory of harm 
which is the basis of its competition concerns. Fourth, the Court of 
First Instance (the General Court) restricts the circumstances where it 
will limit itself to a manifest error of appreciation standard of review 
of the proportionality of the commitments to cases where it is 
established that the Commission has undertaken a comparison of the 
various possible commitments involving complex technical or 
economic analysis. Fifth, the Court of First Instance adopts a 
relatively broad view of undertakings concerned by a commitment 
decision and upholds the procedural rights of some third parties which 
should be given the same rights as the concerned undertakings. 
Two types of commentaries were made following the adoption 
of the Court of First Instance Judgment. A small number of authors 
were of the opinion that the Court of First Instance had erred in 
limiting too greatly the discretion of the Commission. For example, 
Firat Cengiz noted that:  
[I]n Alrosa, the General Court did not adhere to the limits 
of judicial review implied by the objective proportionality 
analysis. The Court placed itself in the position of the 
                                                                                                                                     
case? Can the Commission trade off a fine it would normally impose for a like 
infringement of competition rules against a far-reaching remedy that it can not 
be sure courts would accept? ... Another set of questions relates to the 
procedural rights in commitment decision procedures: do the undertakings 
concerned, as well as third parties, enjoy essentially the same rights as in an 
infringement proceeding under Art. 7 of Reg. 1/2003, in particular as regards 
the right to be heard and the right to access to the file, or can these rights be 
curtailed for reasons of procedural efficiency? Furthermore, can a commitment 
decision be appealed by the undertakings that have offered the commitments, 
or does the voluntary nature of commitments impede such a complaint?”  
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Commission, conducted its own alternative factual and 
economic analysis, and actively searched for less onerous 
measures than those made binding by the Commission’s 
decision. As a result, by any standard the Court's analysis 
and consequent judgment overly intruded on the 
Commission's discretion.66 
However, this criticism is not fully justified. An EU court 
conducts an objective analysis in the judicial review of the principle 
of proportionality when it assesses the appropriateness and necessity 
of a measure in relation to the specific aim pursued by the EC 
Commission. First, the Court of First Instance stated that it would 
limit itself to a manifest error of appreciation standard of review of 
the proportionality principle, if—and only if—the Commission had 
engaged in a complex technical or economic analysis. Thus the Court 
of First Instance did not deny the discretion of the Commission when 
it uses complex technical or economic arguments—such as, for 
example, in all merger cases.  
The Court of First Instance argued that the Commission had 
stated that it had not conducted such a complex technical or economic 
analysis in assessing the appropriateness and the necessity of the De 
Beers commitment. Therefore deference to the discretion of the 
Commission was not justified in this case and to establish whether the 
cessation of all commercial relations between De Beers and Alrosa 
was necessary to meet the competition concern expressed by the 
Commission, the court legitimately examined whether a less drastic 
reduction than the cessation of all commercial practice, like the joint 
commitments offered by De Beers and Alrosa, could have met the 
concern of the Commission. Second, it should also be pointed out 
that, even under a manifest error of appreciation standard, respectful 
of the discretion allowed to the Commission, the question of whether 
the commitment made binding by the Commission is the least onerous 
of the commitments offered which meet the concern of the 
Commission would require, on the part of the Court of First Instance, 
consideration of the effectiveness and of the cost of the various 
commitments offered by the parties and therefore the consideration of 
“complex” counterfactuals.  
                                                            
66. Firat Cengiz, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the EU Competition Law 
Regime After Alrosa, 7 EUR. COMPETITION J., No.1, 127, 150 (2011). 
2015] THE ALROSA JUDGMENT 751 
A significant number of other commentators such as Damien 
Gerard had a more positive view of the Court of First Instance 
judgment. He stated on his blog:  
There was something refreshing in the judgment rendered 
in 2007 by the General Court (GC) in the Alrosa case (T-
170/06). If somewhat excessive in the formulation of some 
of its grounds, the GC had displayed a clear willingness to 
control the exercise of the Commission’s discretion in 
Article 9 (commitments) proceedings and to fill in the legal 
black hole of the (third?) parties’ due process rights. In 
doing so, it had endeavoured to go beyond legal formalism 
and brought its reasoning to a level of transparency not 
often encountered. 
In any case, the judgment of the Court of First Instance seems to 
have had two sorts of effects on the Commission. First, the 
Commission seems to have slowed down its recourse to commitment 
decisions. For a period of twenty-six months between July 11, 2007, 
when the Court of First Instance published its Alrosa judgment, and 
September 17, 2009, when Advocate General Kokott’s opinion to the 
European Court of Justice, in which she advocated the overturn of the 
decision of the Court of First instance, became public, only four 
commitment decisions were adopted by the Commission; whereas 
four commitment decisions were adopted in the four months that 
followed the publication of Advocate General Kokott’s opinion. 
Second, the Commission seems to have (somewhat) disciplined itself 
in trying to avoid having its decisions appealed for lack of 
proportionality and/or for over-reaching.  
As Suzanne Rab, Daphne Monnoyeur, and Anjali Sukhtankar 
suggest: “A comparison of cases post-Alrosa suggests the 
Commission was alive to the risk of challenge based on the 
proportionality of commitments but that the backdrop of third party 
complaints in specific cases could also be a relevant factor.”67 They 
observe that in Distrigaz, where the Commission adopted its first 
commitment decision after the Alrosa Court of First Instance 
judgment, the Commission specifically addressed the issue of 
proportionality of the commitments and explicitly stated that the 
proceedings could be reopened if new facts established that the 
                                                            
67. Suzanne Rab et al., Commitments in EU Competition Cases Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003, its Application and the Challenges Ahead, 1 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC., No. 3, 
171, 183 (2010). 
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commitments were no longer proportionate. This may have been 
prompted by the fact that one of the third parties argued that 
consumers preferred longer contracts to shorter ones. However, in 
cases where the Commission did not fear an appeal by a third party, 
such as in the motor vehicle case, it continued not addressing the 
issue of proportionality of the remedy.68 
C. The Decision of the European Court of Justice 
The Commission appealed the Court of First Instance judgment 
in the Alrosa case. The hopes of those who thought that the Court’s 
effective oversight of the use of commitment decisions, on the one 
hand, would ensure that the Commission would not go beyond what 
was necessary to bring an end to the infringements it was concerned 
about and, on the other hand, would ensure that a broad interpretation 
of the rights of defendants and third parties would prevail, were 
quickly dashed: First, by the publication on September 17, 2009 of 
Advocate General Kokott’s opinion to the European Court of Justice 
in which she sided with the Commission and advocated overturning 
the Court of First Instance (General Court) judgment; and second, by 
the judgment of the European Court of Justice which was delivered 
on June 29, 2010. The European Court of Justice annulled the 
decision of the General Court and made the following main points: 
 Article 9 commitment decisions are “a new mechanism 
introduced by Regulation No 1/2003 which is intended to 
ensure that the competition rules laid down in the EC 
Treaty are applied effectively, by means of the adoption of 
decisions making commitments, proposed by the parties 
and considered appropriate by the Commission, binding in 
order to provide a more rapid solution to the competition 
problems identified by the Commission, instead of 
proceeding by making a formal finding of an infringement. 
More particularly, Article 9 of the regulation is based on 
considerations of procedural economy, and enables 
undertakings to participate fully in the procedure, by 
putting forward the solutions which appear to them to be 
the most appropriate and capable of addressing the 
Commission’s concerns.”69 
                                                            
68. Commission Decision 2007/788 Relating To a Proceeding Pursuant To Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty, 2007 O.J. (L 317) 76. 
69. Comm’n v. Alrosa, Case C‑441/07 P, [2010] E.C.R. I-05949, ¶ 35.  
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What is important to determine how the proportionality principle 
should be applied to Article 7 infringement decisions and to Article 9 
commitment decisions is the dissimilarity of the mechanisms of the 
two provisions and the dissimilarity of the means of action they allow 
the Commission to take. If the two provisions provide for different 
mechanisms and different means of action, then they have different 
objectives—unlike what the Court of First Instance (General Court) 
stated—and they have different underlying concepts. In its paragraph 
38, the ECJ states:  
The specific characteristics of the mechanisms provided for 
in Articles 7 and 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 and the means 
of action available under each of those provisions are 
different, which means that the obligation on the 
Commission to ensure that the principle of proportionality 
is observed has a different extent and content, depending on 
whether it is considered in relation to the former or the 
latter article.70 
And in its paragraph 46 the ECJ states:  
Those two provisions of Regulation No 1/2003, as noted in 
paragraph 38 above, pursue different objectives, one of 
them aiming to put an end to the infringement that has been 
found to exist and the other aiming to address the 
Commission’s concerns following its preliminary 
assessment.71  
Finally, in its paragraph 50 the Court asserts that the two 
provisions have different underlying concepts. 
Because Article 9—unlike Article 7—does not require the 
Commission to make a finding of infringement, its task is simply to 
examine if the commitments proposed by the firms under 
investigation meets the competition concerns of the Commission. 
Therefore:  
Application of the principle of proportionality by the 
Commission in the context of Article 9 of Regulation No 
1/2003 is confined to verifying that the commitments in 
question address the concerns it expressed to the 
undertakings concerned and that they have not offered less 
onerous commitments that also address those concerns 
adequately. When carrying out that assessment, the 
                                                            
70. Id. ¶ 38. 
71. Id. ¶46.  
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Commission must, however, take into consideration the 
interests of third parties.  
The Commission is not required to seek out less onerous or more 
moderate solutions than the commitment offered to it.72 Its only 
obligation, when a commitment is offered, is to assess whether this 
commitment addresses its concern. Firms which propose 
commitments that go beyond what the Commission could impose do 
so consciously, and they are willing to do this in exchange for the 
benefits of avoiding an infringement decision and a possible fine. In 
its paragraph 48 the ECJ states:  
Undertakings which offer commitments on the basis of 
Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 consciously accept that 
the concessions they make may go beyond what the 
Commission could itself impose on them in a decision 
adopted under Article 7 of the regulation after a thorough 
examination. On the other hand, the closure of the 
infringement proceedings brought against those 
undertakings allows them to avoid a finding of an 
infringement of competition law and a possible fine.73  
Therefore making such commitments binding does not breach 
the principle of proportionality—as it should be applied for Article 9 
commitment decisions. The only questions which the Commission 
should address are the following: Does the commitment proposed 
address the concerns of the Commission, and have the firms offered 
less onerous commitments? The Commission does not have to ask 
itself whether there could be less costly commitments than the one 
offered by the firms.  
The standard of judicial review to be applied with respect to the 
proportionality principle is solely a manifest error of appreciation 
standard. In paragraph 42, the ECJ states: “Judicial review for its part 
relates solely to whether the Commission’s assessment is manifestly 
incorrect.”74 It follows from Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 that 
the Commission has wide discretion to make a proposed commitment 
binding or to reject it and that the Commission is not required to give 
reasons for rejecting a commitment and/or for suggesting or not 
suggesting that the parties offer a new commitment.75 It is only if it 
                                                            
72. Id. ¶ 61. 
73. Id. ¶ 48. 
74. Id. ¶ 42. 
75. Id. ¶ 94-95. 
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was established that the Commission, without an objective reason, 
had made a single factual situation the subject of two separate sets of 
proceedings that Alrosa would have to be accorded the rights enjoyed 
by an undertaking concerned in relation to the proceedings brought 
under Article 82 against De Beers.76 
The ECJ decision suggests a number of comments. First, it is 
undoubtedly true, as the ECJ mentions, that the commitment 
decisions were adopted in order to ensure that the competition rules 
laid down in the EC Treaty be applied effectively. One of the ways to 
allow for more effective enforcement of the competition rules laid 
down in the Treaty is to allow the Commission to accept 
commitments proposed by the parties which meet its competition 
concerns. But the objective of the competition rules laid down in the 
Treaty is, as Recital 9 of Regulation 1/2003 reminds us, the protection 
of competition on the market.  
Second, there are two possible enhanced risks associated with 
Article 9 commitment decisions compared to enforcement decisions. 
The first one is that the Commission errs in the formulation of its 
competition concerns—for example by having an unjustified concern; 
the second one is that the remedies offered and accepted go beyond 
what is strictly necessary—what is the least costly way—to meet the 
competition concern, in which case the remedies may unduly restrict 
the ability of some firms to compete—either the firms which have 
offered the commitments or some of the firms affected by the 
commitment. Indeed, an effective remedy against one actual or 
potential violation of the EU competition law may not necessarily 
improve competition on the market. For example, in a case like the 
one at hand, if the commitment offered by De Beers were to make it 
impossible for Alrosa to sell rough diamonds on the international 
market, the risk of collusion between De Beers and Alrosa on this 
market would be eliminated but competition on the international 
market would not necessarily increase, and the foreclosure effect 
would not necessarily disappear since De Beers would have an even 
more dominant position on the market. Such a commitment would be 
effective but would not meet the objective of the competition rules 
laid down in the Treaty—which is the protection of competition on 
the markets. Thus the effectiveness of the commitment mechanism 
cannot be assessed just by looking at the appropriateness of the 
                                                            
76. Id. ¶ 89. 
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commitments to meet the concerns expressed by the Commission. It 
is also necessary to control whether they are the least burdensome on 
the undertakings, because only if they are the least burdensome is the 
possible contradiction between commitment decisions and the 
objective of competition law minimized.  
Enforcement decisions limit the risk of type I or type II errors 
but are more costly both for the enforcement agency and for the firms 
concerned; commitment decisions may entail a larger risk of 
deviation from what would maximize competition but are, in 
principle, less costly to achieve. Because they entail a larger risk of 
deviation from what would protect competition—either because the 
Commission may have misread the competitive situation, because it 
tries to regulate a market for the future by using law enforcement 
tools, or because the parties have proposed commitments which go 
beyond what would be the most efficient way to solve the competition 
problem—which are preceded by a fuller contradictory debate, a more 
transparent procedure and which are, to a limited extent, appealable 
on the merits—commitment decisions should be more closely 
scrutinized in the review process than enforcement decisions.  
Third, the limits attached to the discretion of the Commission in 
designing remedies in Article 7 (enforcement) decisions have a dual 
legal and economic purpose. Article 7 affirms the applicability of the 
legal principle of proportionality in administrative decisions taken on 
the basis of the competition provisions of the Treaty—i.e., that 
competition remedies should be appropriate and necessary—but it 
also gives a specific economic interpretation of what the principle 
should mean in the context of competition enforcement decisions. It 
specifies that between two behavioral remedies, the least burdensome 
for the undertaking concerned should be preferred and that structural 
remedies—which are likely to overshoot the goal of eliminating the 
particular behavioral infringement concerned—should be used only if 
there are no equally effective behavioral remedies or if such remedies 
would end up being more burdensome than the structural remedy. 
Those constraints on the freedom of the Commission are designed to 
minimize the cost of the remedies to the undertakings and to third 
parties in order to allow them to enjoy the maximum freedom of 
competition on the markets compatible with the elimination of the 
violation. The proportionality requirement applied to enforcement 
decisions contributes to making the effective enforcement of 
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competition law consistent with the goal which underlies the 
competition provisions of the EC Treaty.  
Yet, after having stated that the commitment decisions and the 
infringement decisions have different objectives, the Court tells us 
that for commitment decisions under the proportionality principle the 
Commission has no duty to verify that the commitments it accepts 
minimize the burden on the undertakings.77 In other words, if the 
commitment proposed terminates the violation but unnecessarily 
limits the strategic freedom of the interested undertakings to compete 
on the market, the Commission does not have a duty to suggest 
another commitment which would be less costly for the undertakings 
and for society. This interpretation of the proportionality principle is 
uniquely focused on the appropriateness of the commitment and 
disregards entirely the issue of the consistency between the 
effectiveness of the solution and the objectives of competition law.  
Such a disregard for the compatibility between effectiveness and 
the pursuit of the goal of competition law is particularly difficult to 
accept in the specific circumstances of the case since the Court of 
Justice acknowledges that it was the Commission—and not the 
parties—which designed the commitment and that it chose to ask for 
the cessation of all commercial relations between De Beers and 
Alrosa, knowing full well that this remedy was more than what was 
necessary to remedy its competition concern. Indeed, paragraph 86 
states that: 
At the meeting of 27 October 2005, Alrosa (. . .) was 
informed of the nature of the commitments which the 
Commission expected the parties to give following the 
negative result of the consultation with third parties, 
namely cessation of all relations with effect from 2009 and 
a new offer of commitments on that basis.78 
And in paragraph 55 of its judgment the ECJ states that: 
[The Commission] explained that, after carrying out the 
economic assessment, it had been unable to determine the 
precise level of sales which would safely address all its 
concerns as regards competition. It therefore accepted a 
                                                            
77. Id. ¶ 61 (“[T]he Commission is not required itself to seek out less onerous or more 
moderate solutions than the commitments offered to it . . . .”). 
78. Id. ¶ 86. 
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commitment which gave it a saving of time compared to a 
complex investigation s own concern.79 
 In other words, the Commission, which is primarily in charge of 
enforcing EU law can, in the name of effectiveness, request 
commitments which it knows are over reaching and which may 
unnecessarily limit the freedom of the interested undertakings to 
compete on the market, thus contradicting the objectives of EU law 
without having a duty, at least when it requests commitments, to 
ensure that the remedy requested is the least burdensome for the 
undertakings. 
Fourth, the European Court of Justice tries hard to justify the fact 
that enforcement decisions and commitment decisions have different 
objectives to counter the argument of the Court of First Instance (the 
General Court) according to which “the objective of Article 7(1) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 is the same as that of Article 9(1) of that 
regulation and is indissociable from the main objective of Regulation 
No 1/2003, which is to ensure the effective application of the 
competition rules laid down under the Treaty.”80 However, the 
reasoning of the Court is not very convincing and seems to be overly 
legalistic.  
 The European Court of Justice starts from the fact that the two 
procedures have different “mechanisms” and different “means of 
action,” to infer that they have different “objectives”—and that they 
have different underlying concepts.81 But the inference that two 
different means of action and two different mechanisms imply 
different objectives is far from obvious since common experience 
suggests that there may be different ways and different mechanisms to 
arrive at the same objective.82 The argument of the ECJ on this 
                                                            
79. Id. ¶ 55. 
80. Alrosa v. Comm’n Case T-170/06, , [2007] E.C.R. II-02601, ¶ 95. 
81. Alrosa, [2010] E.C.R. I-05949, ¶¶ 38, 50. 
82. The TTIP negotiations underway between the European Union and the United States 
provide an extremely good example of the fact that different mechanisms and means are used 
to arrive at the same objective. Indeed, an important part of these negotiations is concerned 
with the regulatory environment of both entities—for example, in dangerous chemicals or in 
automobiles. Thus both the United States and the European Union try to protect the lives of 
their citizens and therefore have the same objective when it comes to automobile safety. But 
they try to achieve this goal by different means. The European Union has a strict ban against 
driving without a safety belt and an energetic enforcement of the ban. In the United States, 
most seat belt legislation is left to the states. New Hampshire does not have any legislation 
forcing drivers to wear a seat belt. In other states, driving without a seat belt is either a primary 
or a secondary violation depending on the state. But in the United States, there are regulations 
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ground is unconvincing because it does not explain why, in this 
particular case, the fact that Article 7 and Article 9 have different 
mechanisms and different means of action implies that they have 
different objectives even though they are two methods to close a case 
while ensuring that the violation—actual or potential—is brought to 
an end, and while the Commission can choose between these two 
procedures.  
The ECJ emphasizes the “contractual” nature of commitment 
decisions to buttress its argument that commitment decisions have a 
different mechanism than enforcement decisions, and that in 
commitment decisions, the task of the Commission is confined to 
examining, and possibly accepting, the commitments offered by the 
undertakings concerned in the light of the problems identified by it in 
its preliminary assessment and having regard to the aims pursued. The 
European Court of Justice judgment states:  
Undertakings which offer commitments on the basis of 
Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 consciously accept that 
the concessions they make may go beyond what the 
Commission could itself impose on them in a decision 
adopted under Article 7 of the regulation after a thorough 
examination. On the other hand, the closure of the 
infringement proceedings brought against those 
undertakings allows them to avoid a finding of an 
infringement of competition law and a possible fine.83  
Advocate General Kokott had emphasized the implication of the 
fact that in Article 9 procedures, commitments are offered by the 
undertakings. She stated—paragraph 55 of her conclusions—that 
because commitments are offered by undertakings: “necessity may be 
presumed as a matter of course in relation to the interests of the 
undertaking which has offered the commitments (in this case De 
Beers).”84 She added that: “such a presumption cannot be made where 
the interests of third parties (in this case Alrosa) are affected.”85 The 
Court followed this lead and stated:  
                                                                                                                                     
on the design of cars to make driving safe, which do not exist in Europe. The question raised in 
the TTIP is that of trying to get the two countries to agree that they use different means to 
achieve the same goal—and to liberalize trade in automobiles. 
83. Alrosa, [2010] E.C.R. I-05949.  
84. Id. ¶ 55. 
85. Id. 
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Application of the principle of proportionality by the 
Commission in the context of Article 9 of Regulation No 
1/2003 is confined to verifying that the commitments in 
question address the concerns it expressed to the 
undertakings concerned and that they have not offered less 
onerous commitments that also address those concerns 
adequately. When carrying out that assessment, the 
Commission must, however, take into consideration the 
interests of third parties.86  
The idea that commitments are freely offered by the 
undertakings and that as a result the interests of the undertakings are 
safeguarded is, however, a fiction which would be believable only if 
the incentive of the Commission was purely to solve at the least 
possible cost a case for which the theory of harm was well 
established, if the undertakings offering such commitments had other 
options—as we argued previously—and if there was no possibility 
that the Commission and the undertakings offering the commitments 
were not colluding to the detriment of third parties.  
In the Alrosa case this fiction is particularly difficult to believe 
since, as we saw, the decision of the European Court of Justice 
acknowledges the fact that the Commission itself informed the firms 
of the commitments that it was expecting them to offer and that it 
knew that the commitments suggested were overbroad. This case 
shows convincingly that necessity cannot be assumed. What the firms 
have to offer is what the Commission will accept and not what would 
be necessary to solve the competition concern it has expressed, 
particularly in cases where the Commission is unwilling to commit 
the necessary resources to find out what is the minimal commitment 
which would meet its concerns. 
Fifth, the European Court of Justice states in paragraph 42 that 
“[j]udicial review for its part relates solely to whether the 
Commission’s assessment is manifestly incorrect,”87 thus rejecting the 
view of the Court of First Instance that:  
[T]he analysis which the Commission is required to carry 
out in proceedings initiated under Regulation No 1/2003 
concerns, whether a decision adopted under Article 7(1) or 
Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 is involved, existing 
practices. Plainly, that fact does not mean that complex 
                                                            
86. Id. ¶ 41. 
87. Id. ¶ 42. 
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economic assessments may not be necessary, but it cannot 
mean that, in the absence of such assessments, the review 
undertaken by the Court of the decisions of the 
Commission is, on any basis, to be limited to manifest 
errors of assessment.88 
In the Alrosa judgment, the ECJ departed from its usual position 
on enforcement decisions that:  
Examination by the Community judicature of the complex 
economic assessments made by the Commission must 
necessarily be confined to verifying whether the rules on 
procedure and on the statement of reasons have been 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately 
stated and whether there has been any manifest error of 
appraisal or misuse of powers.89  
Indeed, what that position suggests is that, for enforcement 
decisions, a more exacting standard of review of decisions can be 
applied for decisions which do not rely on complex economic 
assessments.  
This departure may mean that the European Court of Justice 
considers that the definition of “remedy meeting the concern of the 
Commission” necessarily implies a complex economic analysis and it 
may mean that only a low standard of review should be applied by the 
courts to commitment decisions since, on the one hand, the rights of 
the parties are unlikely to have been breached because of the nature of 
the process—characterized by a voluntary cooperation between the 
Commission and the undertakings concerned—and, on the other hand, 
the ability of the Commission to fulfill its task of enforcing the 
competition rules effectively in the general interest must be 
preserved.90 
Whatever the reason, and as the previous discussion has shown, 
one can question both whether commitment decisions always involve 
complex economic or technical analysis and whether the voluntary 
cooperation process which underlies the model is always realistic.  
                                                            
88. Alrosa, [2007] E.C.R. II-02601, ¶ 110. 
89. Cf. Aalborg Portland and Others v. Commission, Case C-204/00 P, [2004] E.C.R. I-
123, ¶ 279.  
90. See Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts on Evidence and Procedure in European 
Community Competition Law, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1463, 1494 (2006) (providing an 
example of the importance that the Courts attribute to balancing the rights of the parties with 
the ability of the Commission to effectively enforce competition law). 
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V. THE EFFECT OF THE ALROSA DEBATE ON EU 
COMMITMENT DECISIONS 
As Florian Wagner-Von Papp stated: “The CJEU’s judgment in 
Alrosa is rightly interpreted as having completely emasculated the 
proportionality review of commitment decisions.” As a result, one can 
only count on the self-restraint of the Commission to ensure that 
commitment decisions meet the proportionality principle. From that 
standpoint, as Damien Gerard argues, the Alrosa debate has not been 
completely without results, even if the efforts of the Commission are 
limited and if the lack of effective substantive judicial review of 
enforcement decisions and of review of proportionality of 
commitment decisions distorts the incentives in the application of 
commitment decisions.91  
The Commission’s Manual of Procedures contains a limited 
number of provisions which were directly inspired by the Alrosa 
debate. It provides, for example, for the fact that commitment 
decisions should “explain why the commitments resolve the identified 
competition concerns in a proportionate manner.”92 Furthermore, in 
its commitment decisions the Commission started discussing the 
proportionality of the commitments after the Court of First Instance 
(General Court) Alrosa judgment and it has continued to do so even 
after the Advocate General’s Opinion and the judgment of the 
European Court of Justice—notably in the imposition of limited 
duration for the commitments. 
However, the major effect of the Alrosa EU Court of Justice 
Judgment appears to have been to encourage a rapid and somewhat 
uncontrolled increase in the use of commitment decisions by the 
Commission. The lack of sufficient procedural safeguards in the 
commitment procedure, and the reluctance of the ECJ both to control 
the substance of enforcement decisions and the proportionality of 
commitment decisions, has profoundly changed the nature of 
competition law enforcement system in the European Union.  
One of the major differences between Article 7 (enforcement) 
decisions and Article 9 (commitment) decisions is that the focus of 
discussion in Article 7 enforcement decisions is the proof of the (past) 
                                                            
91. See Gerard, supra note 10. 
92. European Commission’s Antitrust Manual of Procedures, §16.2.11, at 178 (March 
2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/information_en.html. [hereinafter 
Commission Manual of Procedures]. 
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violation whereas in Article 9 commitment decisions the focus of 
discussion is the adequacy of the remedy to meet—in the future—the 
concerns of the Commission. The issue is no longer what the parties 
did but what the Commission wants. This means not only that the 
Commission is allowed to take a more regulatory perspective—asking 
for commitments, including structural commitments, which it could 
not have imposed through enforcement decisions—but also that 
reasoned decisions on what is a violation and what is not a violation 
of the law become less and less numerous and are replaced by 
decisions which have—or should have—a very limited value as 
precedents. Thus the EU law enforcement system has moved from a 
regime of ex-post assessment of competition law violations under the 
(weak) supervision of the Courts to a regulatory approach whereby 
the Commission is more concerned by the design of remedies which 
will improve the competitive situation of a market than by the 
characterization of a competition law violation and its elimination.  
In particular, thanks to commitment decisions the Commission 
has been able to bypass the constraints on structural remedies attached 
to Regulation 1/2003. The much-heralded move toward a more 
economic based approach to competition law has become a crumbling 
facade since there are fewer reasoned decisions in which there is a 
clear economic analysis of the competitive impact of investigated 
practices. The risk of type I errors—i.e., interventions of the 
Commission to obtain commitments on the basis of concerns not 
entirely substantiated—has increased, and so has the risk of 
contradiction between the goal of effectiveness of the Commission 
enforcement system and the promotion of efficiency.  
The legitimacy of decisions has seriously decreased as they are 
the results of negotiations—between the Commission, the concerned 
parties and, to a lesser extent, the interested parties—unsupervised by 
the Courts, rather being than the result of a transparent process 
leading to appealable decisions.  
The legal predictability of competition law has also been 
impaired as court judgments are being replaced by thinly motivated 
commitment decisions which, in principle, cannot have precedential 
value but become a kind of “soft” jurisprudence for lack of a set of 
formal court decisions. This development is, in particular, a source of 
concern for abuse of dominance cases in high tech industries where 
the Commission deals with new issues.  
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Damien M.B. Gerard makes this point eloquently when he 
states: “The surge in commitment decisions entailed in various ways a 
paradigmatic shift from a corrective toward a regulatory approach to 
the design of remedies in the EU, which also appears to extend 
beyond negotiated procedures.”93 With a lot of foresight, Heike 
Schweitzer had expressed concerns before the ECJ Alrosa judgment 
when she stated:  
The Commission’s self-interest in expanding the scope of 
its powers would then come to conflict with the public 
interest in public censure, deterrence and, most importantly, 
the development of legal doctrine based on clear precedents 
that only infringement proceedings can bring. Also, the 
Commission could be induced to use its bargaining power 
in commitment procedures to reach beyond the goal to 
remedy a given infringement and to pursue more ambitious 
strategies, attempting to restructure markets according to its 
own vision or to implement noncompetition goals. 
Commitment decisions could thus become a powerful 
instrument for regulating markets.94 
 Those concerns were fully justified in the wake of events 
following the Alrosa ECJ judgment. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 
encourages the development of commitment decisions at the national 
level by providing that, “[t]he competition authorities of the Member 
States shall have the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
in individual cases. For this purpose, acting on their own initiative or 
on a complaint, they may take the following decisions . . . accepting 
commitments . . . .” 
As a consequence, nearly all Member States Competition 
Authorities have now the possibility to accept commitments and some 
of them—the Autorité de la concurrence in France, and the Autorità 
in Italy, at least until 2011, among others—use this possibility quite 
intensively. The procedural context of commitment decisions varies 
from one Member State to another, which means that some of the 
concerns raised at the EU level may be relevant in some countries and 
                                                            
93. See id.  
94. Schweitzer, Heike, Commitment Decisions under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The 
Developing EC Practice and Case Law (October 2008). (EUI Working Papers LAW No. 
2008/22). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306245 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1306245. 
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not in others. However, it is clear that the proliferation of 
commitment decisions at the national level will make it more difficult 
for plaintiffs to seek damages at a time when the promotion of civil 
enforcement at national level is one of the priorities of the 
Commission.  
CONCLUSION  
The Alrosa European Court of Justice decision combined with 
the lack of procedural safeguards for commitment decisions in 
Regulation 1/2003, the low standard of review applied by the 
European Courts for enforcement decisions, and the very limited 
scope of civil enforcement in the European Union give the EU 
Commission an enormous amount of discretion and the power to 
impose solutions to its competition concerns without having to 
develop robust theories of harm.  
This is all the more problematic because until the turn of the 
Twentieth Century it was clear that the Commission—encouraged by 
the European Courts—adhered to a legalistic approach of competition 
law which was criticized as questionable from an economic 
perspective. In the early 2000s some progress was made culminating 
in the Commission’s claim to follow an interpretation of competition 
law more in line with economic reasoning with respect to mergers, 
vertical restraints, and exclusionary abuses of dominance. However, 
the European Court of Justice has allowed the Commission to escape, 
practically at will, the constraints of rigorous characterization of anti-
competitive practices. 
The European Court of Justice has also, with the Alrosa 
Judgment, allowed the Commission to shift its focus, if it wants to, 
from fighting ex post competition law violations to using (pseudo) 
voluntary structural commitments to reshape markets or behavioral 
commitments to regulate them. We have already seen signs of this 
evolution both in the fact that commitment decisions have become the 
dominant form of action of the Commission with respect to non-cartel 
antitrust cases and in the fact that the scope of a number of 
commitment decisions—such as, for example, in the electricity 
sector—clearly goes beyond what is strictly necessary to alleviate the 
competition concern of the Commission. This evolution parallels the 
one followed by the Commission with respect to the financial sector 
in the wake of the crisis of 2008. As early as 2009, Philip Lowe, then 
Director General of Competition of the Commission, explained that 
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the aim of the Commission was to use European merger control 
provisions and state aid provisions not only to forbid anticompetitive 
mergers or competition distorting state aid in the financial markets but 
also to ensure that financial markets would be stronger than they were 
before the crisis and less prone to systemic crisis in the future.  
This process has a systemic implication: as competition 
decisions are now “soft” decisions unsupervised by the courts, the 
development of the case law no longer offers the kind of legal 
predictability—or legitimacy—which is an essential quality of any 
legal system. As Damien Gerard states:  
Eventually, an effectiveness paradox emerges. The 
promotion of negotiated procedures as part of a utility-
maximizing approach to competition law enforcement was 
designed to increase the (enforcement) effectiveness 
thereof. However, insofar as it leads to negotiated 
procedures becoming the default enforcement mechanism, 
that approach has the reverse effect of blurring the contours 
of the law and of leading to a loss in the predictability of 
antitrust principles, thereby leading to a loss in 
(substantive) effectiveness.95 
What then could be—and should be—done to restore the 
commitment decisions procedure to what could be useful to increase 
the effectiveness of law enforcement without at the same time 
encouraging the overuse and misuse of the procedure? 
First, it would be necessary to ensure that that Article 7 
(enforcement) decisions are subject to a full judicial review. If 
investigated firms are offered the possibility of arguing their case in 
front of the European Courts, they may be less tempted to offer 
commitments when they do not feel that the Commission has a case 
against them or when they feel that the commitments likely to be 
accepted by the Commission are disproportionate. From that 
standpoint, it is interesting to note that Article 13 of Regulation 
1/2003 provides that: “The Court of Justice shall have unlimited 
jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a 
fine or periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, reduce, or increase 
the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed.” This formulation 
suggests that Regulation 1/2003 intended to give unlimited 
jurisdiction to the Courts to review the substance of Article 7 
                                                            
95. See Gerard, supra note 10. 
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enforcement decisions. It is only a restrictive reading of Article 13 of 
Regulation 1/2003 combined with the wording of Article 261 of the 
Treaty which suggests that the Courts have unlimited jurisdiction only 
on the fines and not on the substantive part of the decisions imposing 
them.96 Thus Courts themselves could acknowledge the fact that they 
have full jurisdiction over Article 7 enforcement decisions. 
It is to be noted that appellate and even supreme courts in a 
number of EU Member States have full review powers over the 
decisions of antitrust authorities97 and do not hesitate to examine in 
detail complex economic arguments. Their level of scrutiny goes 
beyond the manifest error of appreciation standard used by the 
European courts, even in complex cases. So national experiences 
show that the complexity of the economic or technical elements of the 
Commission’s decision is not an un-surmountable obstacle for review 
courts to exercise their vigilance. As Heike Schweitzer suggests:  
Whether there is a need to adapt the procedural framework 
or practice to the new challenge of ensuring full judicial 
review in the light of an increased use of complex 
economic methodologies is a matter of debate. In some 
cases, courts may want to make broader use of court-
appointed experts in the future. Yet, the greatest difficulty 
may not lie in understanding economic theories typically 
presented in some clarity by the parties, but in aptly 
translating them into law. This is a genuinely legal task.98 
Second, as we have argued, one of the risks of the current 
situation is that the Article 9 (commitment) decisions procedure can 
be overused and/or used for questionable purposes. There are three 
measures which the Commission could take to ensure a better 
equilibrium among the goals of effectiveness of the Commission’s 
actions, contribution to the goals of EU competition law, legitimacy 
of Article 9 decisions, and respect for the rights of investigated firms.  
                                                            
96. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 261, 2012 O.J. C 
326/01 (“Regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and by the 
Council, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaties, may give the Court of Justice of the 
European Union unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the penalties provided for in such 
regulations”). 
97. This is, for example, the case of the Paris Court of Appeal in France. 
98. Heike Schweitzer, Judicial Review in EU Competition Law, in HANDBOOK ON 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEDURE 491, 538 (Damien Geradin 
& Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). 
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First, the Commission should conform to the letter and the spirit 
of Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 which states, “Commitment 
decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends 
to impose a fine.” In other words, after having sent a preliminary 
assessment, the Commission should be able, if appropriate 
commitments to meet its concerns are not offered, to revert back to an 
infringement decision imposing injunctions but without the possibility 
to impose a fine—since the preliminary assessment should not have 
been prepared if the Commission intended to fine the firms. This 
would force the Commission to be more selective in choosing the 
cases in which it wants to use commitment procedures; it would also 
make the investigated firms freer to offer commitments that are not 
overbroad since the consequences they would incur if they did not 
offer commitments that were accepted by the Commission would be 
more limited.  
Second, the Commission should also clearly define the types of 
cases for which, in the name of effectiveness, it might prefer 
commitment decisions to enforcement decisions. In the EC’s Antitrust 
Manual of Proceedings, the Commission states:  
Another aspect which may militate against the 
“commitment path”, from a policy point of view, is the 
different precedent value of commitment decisions 
compared to final decisions under Article 7. Commitment 
decisions do not actually find an infringement, and the 
factual and legal assessment may be shorter than in 
decisions under Article 7. The more limited risk of an 
appeal may also reduce the Commission's chances to have 
contentious legal issues clarified by the Court. If the 
Commission therefore wants to establish an important 
precedent, it may prefer the path of an Article 7 decision.99 
According to the Commission’s policy brief: 
[T]he Commission will prefer article 7 decisions in cases of 
very serious infringements, such as cartels, as well as when 
there is no remedy available to solve the competition 
problem other than a cease-and-desist order…. A 
commitment under article 9 to comply with the law in the 
future (e.g. committing not to share markets or not to apply 
resale price maintenance) would not be accepted…In 
contrast an article 9 decision is more appropriate when the 
                                                            
99. Commission Manual of Procedures, supra note 91, at 178. 
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primary target is not the punishment of past behavior but 
adjusting future behavior...The Commission retains a wide 
margin of discretion ….at the same time this margin has a 
limit in cartel cases…article 101 or 102 infringements 
where no effective, clear and precise remedies can be 
identified will continue to be addressed through article 7 
decisions . . . .100  
Yet, the practice of the Commission has clearly been to use the 
commitment decision procedure in fast evolving high tech industries 
where the antitrust issues are complex and very few precedents 
exist—see, for example, the Rambus case or the Microsoft case or the 
Google case. In those cases, the Commission argues that there was a 
pressing need to intervene. The result is that the Commission reserves 
the possibility to use Article 9 commitment decisions in nearly all the 
cases—except in cartel cases—and that reality seems to contradict the 
initial intention of the Commission. As Botteman and Agapi suggest, 
“[T]he EC could indicate that cases involving novel legal issues or 
largely untested theories of harm, where the EC needs to establish a 
precedent are not to be resolved through commitment decisions.”101 
Third, Article 35(16) of the EC’s Antitrust Manual of 
Proceedings states, “After receiving the Preliminary Assessment, the 
undertaking under investigation has—in contrast to an Article 7 
decision—no right to request a hearing pursuant to Article 12. Neither 
Regulation 1/2003 nor Regulation 773/2004 expressly provide for 
access to file in the context of Article 9 proceedings.” Furthermore, 
EC competition officials do not hide the fact that they consider that 
one of the advantages of the commitment decision for the 
Commission is precisely the lack of access to file for the parties.102 It 
is submitted that as commitment decisions have become the most 
frequent form of decisions related to antitrust violations, the lack of 
access to the file for the investigated firms or for the complainants 
and the impossibility for the investigated firm to require a hearing—
combined with the fact that the Commission does not have to give 
                                                            
100.  Competition Policy Brief, supra note 12, at 3–4.  
101. See Botteman & Patsa, supra note 32. 
102. See, e.g., Kris Dekeyser, Alternative Procedures in the European Antitrust Legal 
Framework: Cartel Settlements and Commitment Decisions, 7, available at 
http://www.euchinacomp.org/index.php/cartels/20-cartels/remedies/161-alternative-
procedures-in-the-european-antitrust-legal-framework-cartel-settlements-and-commitment-
decisions. 
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reasons to refuse a commitment—becomes less and less tolerable. 
Regulation 1/2003 was written at a time when everybody, including 
the Commission, thought that the use of commitment decisions would 
remain quite limited and would be used only in relatively simple 
cases where the legal principles were clearly established. The 
situation has now changed due to the extensive use of commitment 
decisions by the Commission, and it is urgent that the Commission 
revises the procedural framework of commitment decisions.  
 
 
